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Socrates
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Socrates | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Born | c. 470 BC |
| Died | 399 BC (aged approx. 71) Athens |
Cause of death | Forced suicide by poisoning |
| Spouse(s) | Xanthippe, Myrto (disputed) |
| Children | Lamprocles, Menexenus, Sophroniscus |
| Family | Sophroniscus (father), Phaenarete (mother), Patrocles (half-brother) |
| Philosophical work | |
| Era | Ancient Greek philosophy |
| Region | Western philosophy |
| Classical Greek philosophy | |
Notable students | |
Main interests | |
Notable ideas | |
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"Wisdom begins in wonder." (11/01/2022) (09/10/2023)
"Wonder is the beginning of wisdom."
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Socrates (born c. 470 BCE, Athens [Greece]—died 399 BCE, Athens) was an ancient Greek philosopher whose way of life, character, and thought exerted a profound influence on Classical antiquity and Western philosophy.
Socrates was a widely recognized and controversial figure in his native Athens, so much so that he was frequently mocked in the plays of comic dramatists. (The Clouds of Aristophanes, produced in 423, is the best-known example.) Although Socrates himself wrote nothing, he is depicted in conversation in compositions by a small circle of his admirers—Plato and Xenophon first among them. He is portrayed in these works as a man of great insight, integrity, self-mastery, and argumentative skill. The impact of his life was all the greater because of the way in which it ended: at age 70, he was brought to trial on a charge of impiety and sentenced to death by poisoning (the poison probably being hemlock) by a jury of his fellow citizens. Plato’s Apology of Socrates purports to be the speech Socrates gave at his trial in response to the accusations made against him (Greek apologia means “defense”). Its powerful advocacy of the examined life and its condemnation of Athenian democracy have made it one of the central documents of Western thought and culture.
Philosophical and literary sources
While Socrates was alive, he was, as noted, the object of comic ridicule, but most of the plays that make reference to him are entirely lost or exist only in fragmentary form—Clouds being the chief exception. Although Socrates is the central figure of this play, it was not Aristophanes’ purpose to give a balanced and accurate portrait of him (comedy never aspires to this) but rather to use him to represent certain intellectual trends in contemporary Athens—the study of language and nature and, as Aristophanes implies, the amoralism and atheism that accompany these pursuits. The value of the play as a reliable source of knowledge about Socrates is thrown further into doubt by the fact that, in Plato’s Apology, Socrates himself rejects it as a fabrication. This aspect of the trial will be discussed more fully below.
Soon after Socrates’ death, several members of his circle preserved and praised his memory by writing works that represent him in his most characteristic activity—conversation. His interlocutors in these (typically adversarial) exchanges included people he happened to meet, devoted followers, prominent political figures, and leading thinkers of the day. Many of these “Socratic discourses,” as Aristotle calls them in his Poetics, are no longer extant; there are only brief remnants of the conversations written by Antisthenes, Aeschines, Phaedo, and Eucleides. But those composed by Plato and Xenophon survive in their entirety. What knowledge we have of Socrates must therefore depend primarily on one or the other (or both, when their portraits coincide) of these sources. (Plato and Xenophon also wrote separate accounts, each entitled Apology of Socrates, of Socrates’ trial.) Most scholars, however, do not believe that every Socratic discourse of Xenophon and Plato was intended as a historical report of what the real Socrates said, word-for-word, on some occasion. What can reasonably be claimed about at least some of these dialogues is that they convey the gist of the questions Socrates asked, the ways in which he typically responded to the answers he received, and the general philosophical orientation that emerged from these conversations.
Xenophon
Among the compositions of Xenophon, the one that gives the fullest portrait of Socrates is Memorabilia. The first two chapters of Book I of this work are especially important, because they explicitly undertake a refutation of the charges made against Socrates at his trial; they are therefore a valuable supplement to Xenophon’s Apology, which is devoted entirely to the same purpose. The portrait of Socrates that Xenophon gives in Books III and IV of Memorabilia seems, in certain passages, to be heavily influenced by his reading of some of Plato’s dialogues, and so the evidentiary value of at least this portion of the work is diminished. Xenophon’s Symposium is a depiction of Socrates in conversation with his friends at a drinking party (it is perhaps inspired by a work of Plato of the same name and character) and is regarded by some scholars as a valuable re-creation of Socrates’ thought and way of life. Xenophon’s Oeconomicus (literally: “estate manager”), a Socratic conversation concerning household organization and the skills needed by the independent farmer, is Xenophon’s attempt to bring the qualities he admired in Socrates to bear upon the subject of overseeing one’s property. It is unlikely to have been intended as a report of one of Socrates’ conversations.
Plato
Plato, unlike Xenophon, is generally regarded as a philosopher of the highest order of originality and depth. According to some scholars, his philosophical skills made him far better able than Xenophon was to understand Socrates and therefore more valuable a source of information about him. The contrary view is that Plato’s originality and vision as a philosopher led him to use his Socratic discourses not as mere devices for reproducing the conversations he had heard but as vehicles for the advocacy of his own ideas (however much they may have been inspired by Socrates) and that he is therefore far more untrustworthy than Xenophon as a source of information about the historical Socrates. Whichever of these two views is correct, it is undeniable that Plato is not only the deeper philosopher but also the greater literary artist. Some of his dialogues are so natural and lifelike in their depiction of conversational interplay that readers must constantly remind themselves that Plato is shaping his material, as any author must.
Although Socrates is the interlocutor who guides the conversation in most of Plato’s dialogues, there are several in which he plays a minor role (Parmenides, Sophist, Statesman, and Timaeus, all of which are generally agreed to be among Plato’s later works) and one (Laws, also composed late) in which he is entirely absent. Why did Plato assign Socrates a small role in some dialogues (and none in Laws) and a large role in others? A simple answer is that, by this device, Plato intended to signal to his readers that the dialogues in which Socrates is the major interlocutor convey the philosophy of Socrates, whereas those in which he is a minor figure or does not appear at all present Plato’s own ideas.
But there are formidable objections to this hypothesis, and for several reasons most scholars do not regard it as a serious possibility. To begin with, it is unlikely that in so many of his works Plato would have assigned himself so passive and mechanical a role as merely a recording device for the philosophy of Socrates. Furthermore, the portrait of Socrates that results from this hypothesis is not coherent. In some of the dialogues in which he is the principal interlocutor, for example, Socrates insists that he does not have satisfactory answers to the questions he poses—questions such as “What is courage?” (raised in Laches), “What is self-control?” (Charmides), and “What is piety?” (Euthyphro). In other dialogues in which he plays a major role, however, Socrates does offer systematic answers to such questions. In Books II–X of Republic, for example, he proposes an elaborate answer to the question, “What is justice?,” and in doing so he also defends his view of the ideal society, the condition of the human soul, the nature of reality, and the power of art, among many other topics. Were we to hold that all the Platonic dialogues in which Socrates is the main speaker are depictions of the philosophy of Socrates—a philosophy that Plato endorses but to which he has made no contributions of his own—then we would be committed to the absurd view that Socrates both has and lacks answers to these questions.
For these reasons, there is a broad consensus among scholars that we should not look to works such as Republic, Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Philebus for a historically accurate account of the thought of Socrates—even though they contain a speaker called Socrates who argues for certain philosophical positions and opposes others. At the same time, we can explain why Plato uses the literary character of Socrates in many of his writings to present ideas that go well beyond anything that the historical Socrates said or believed. In these works, Plato is developing ideas that were inspired by his encounter with Socrates, using methods of inquiry borrowed from Socrates, and showing how much can be accomplished with these Socratic starting points. That is why he assigns Socrates the role of principal interlocutor, despite the fact that he did not intend these works to be mere re-creations of Socrates’ conversations.
Accordingly, the dialogues of Plato that adhere most closely to what he heard from Socrates are those in which the interlocutor called Socrates searches, without apparent success, for answers to questions about the nature of the ethical virtues and other practical topics—works such as Laches, Euthyphro, and Charmides. This does not mean that in these dialogues Plato is not shaping his material or that he is merely writing down, word-for-word, conversations he heard. We cannot know, and it is implausible to suppose, that in these dialogues of unsuccessful search there is a pure rendering of what the historical Socrates said, with no admixture of Platonic interpretation or supplement. All we can reasonably suppose is that here, if anywhere, Plato is re-creating the give-and-take of Socratic conversation, conveying a sense of the methods Socrates used and the assumptions that guided him when he challenged others to defend their ethical ideas and their way of life.
The portrait of Socrates in these dialogues is fully consonant with the one in Plato’s Apology, and it serves as a valuable supplement to that work. For in the Apology, Socrates insists that he does not inquire into natural phenomena (“things in the sky and below the earth”), as Aristophanes alleges. On the contrary, he says, he devotes his life to one question only: how he and others can become good human beings, or as good as possible. The questions he asks others, and discovers that they cannot answer, are posed in the hope that he might acquire greater wisdom about just this subject. This is the Socrates we find in Laches, Euthyphro, and Charmides—but not in Phaedo, Phaedrus, Philebus, or Republic. (Or, rather, it is not the Socrates of Books II–X of Republic; the portrait of Socrates in Book I is similar in many ways to that in Apology, Laches, Euthyphro, and Charmides.) We can therefore say this much about the historical Socrates as he is portrayed in Plato’s Apology and in some of Plato’s dialogues: he has a methodology, a pattern of inquiry, and an orientation toward ethical questions. He can see how misguided his interlocutors are because he is extremely adept at discovering contradictions in their beliefs.
“Socratic method” has now come into general usage as a name for any educational strategy that involves cross-examination of students by their teacher. However, the method used by Socrates in the conversations re-created by Plato follows a more specific pattern: Socrates describes himself not as a teacher but as an ignorant inquirer, and the series of questions he asks are designed to show that the principal question he raises (for example, “What is piety?”) is one to which his interlocutor has no adequate answer. Typically, the interlocutor is led, by a series of supplementary questions, to see that he must withdraw the answer he at first gave to Socrates’ principal question, because that answer falls afoul of the other answers he has given. The method employed by Socrates, in other words, is a strategy for showing that the interlocutor’s several answers do not fit together as a group, thus revealing to the interlocutor his own poor grasp of the concepts under discussion. (Euthyphro, for example, in the dialogue named after him, having been asked what piety is, replies that it is whatever is “dear to the gods.” Socrates continues to probe, and the ensuing give-and-take can be summarized as follows: Socrates: Are piety and impiety opposites? Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: Are the gods in disagreement with each other about what is good, what is just, and so on? Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: So the very same actions are loved by some gods and hated by others? Euthyphro: Yes. Socrates: So those same actions are both pious and impious? Euthyphro: Yes.) The interlocutor, having been refuted by means of premises he himself has agreed to, is free to propose a new answer to Socrates’ principal question; or another conversational partner, who has been listening to the preceding dialogue, is allowed to take his place. But although the new answers proposed to Socrates’ principal question avoid the errors revealed in the preceding cross-examination, fresh difficulties are uncovered, and in the end the “ignorance” of Socrates is revealed as a kind of wisdom, whereas the interlocutors are implicitly criticized for failing to recognize their ignorance.
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that, because Socrates professes ignorance about certain questions, he suspends judgment about all matters whatsoever. On the contrary, he has some ethical convictions about which he is completely confident. As he tells his judges in his defense speech: human wisdom begins with the recognition of one’s own ignorance; the unexamined life is not worth living; ethical virtue is the only thing that matters; and a good human being cannot be harmed (because whatever misfortune he may suffer, including poverty, physical injury, and even death, his virtue will remain intact). But Socrates is painfully aware that his insights into these matters leave many of the most important ethical questions unanswered. It is left to his student Plato, using the Socratic method as a starting point and ranging over subjects that Socrates neglected, to offer positive answers to these questions.
Aristotle
Another important source of information about the historical Socrates—Aristotle—provides further evidence for this way of distinguishing between the philosophies of Socrates and Plato. In 367, some 30 years after the death of Socrates, Aristotle (who was then 17 years old) moved to Athens in order to study at Plato’s school, called the Academy. It is difficult to believe that, during his 20 years as a member of that society, Aristotle had no conversations about Socrates with Plato and others who had been personally acquainted with him. There is good reason, then, to suppose that the historical information offered about Socrates in Aristotle’s philosophical writings are based on those conversations. What Aristotle tells his readers is that Socrates asked questions but gave no replies, because he lacked knowledge; that he sought definitions of the virtues; and that he was occupied with ethical matters and not with questions about the natural world. This is the portrait of Socrates that Plato’s writings, judiciously used, give us. The fact that it is confirmed by Aristotle is all the more reason to accept it.
Life and personality of Socrates
Although the sources provide only a small amount of information about the life and personality of Socrates, a unique and vivid picture of him shines through, particularly in some of the works of Plato. We know the names of his father, Sophroniscus (probably a stonemason), his mother, Phaenarete, and his wife, Xanthippe, and we know that he had three sons. (In Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates likens his way of philosophizing to the occupation of his mother, who was a midwife: not pregnant with ideas himself, he assists others with the delivery of their ideas, though they are often stillborn.) With a snub nose and bulging eyes, which made him always appear to be staring, he was unattractive by conventional standards. He served as a hoplite (a heavily armed soldier) in the Athenian army and fought bravely in several important battles. Unlike many of the thinkers of his time, he did not travel to other cities in order to pursue his intellectual interests. Although he did not seek high office, did not regularly attend meetings of the Athenian Assembly (Ecclesia), the city’s principal governing body (as was his privilege as an adult male citizen), and was not active in any political faction, he discharged his duties as a citizen, which included not only military service but occasional membership in the Council of Five Hundred, which prepared the Assembly’s agenda.
Socrates was not well-born or wealthy, but many of his admirers were, and they included several of the most politically prominent Athenian citizens. When the democratic constitution of Athens was overthrown for a brief time in 403, four years before his trial, he did not leave the city, as did many devoted supporters of democratic rule, including his friend Chaerephon, who had gone to Delphi many years earlier to ask the oracle whether anyone was wiser than Socrates. (The answer was no.)
The expression of same-sex love was not unusual in Athens at this time, and Socrates was physically attracted to beautiful young men. This aspect of his personality is most vividly conveyed in the opening pages of Charmides and in the speech of the young and ambitious general Alcibiades at the end of Symposium. Socrates’ long fits of abstraction, his courage in battle, his resistance to hunger and cold, his ability to consume wine without apparent inebriation, and his extraordinary self-control in the presence of sensual attractions are all described with consummate artistry in the opening and closing pages of Symposium.
Socrates’ personality was in some ways closely connected to his philosophical outlook. He was remarkable for the absolute command he maintained over his emotions and his apparent indifference to physical hardships. Corresponding to these personal qualities was his commitment to the doctrine that reason, properly cultivated, can and ought to be the all-controlling factor in human life. Thus he has no fear of death, he says in Plato’s Apology, because he has no knowledge of what comes after it, and he holds that, if anyone does fear death, his fear can be based only on a pretense of knowledge. The assumption underlying this claim is that, once one has given sufficient thought to some matter, one’s emotions will follow suit. Fear will be dispelled by intellectual clarity. Similarly, according to Socrates, if one believes, upon reflection, that one should act in a particular way, then, necessarily, one’s feelings about the act in question will accommodate themselves to one’s belief—one will desire to act in that way. (Thus, Socrates denies the possibility of what has been called “weakness of will”—knowingly acting in a way one believes to be wrong.) It follows that, once one knows what virtue is, it is impossible not to act virtuously. Anyone who fails to act virtuously does so because he incorrectly identifies virtue with something it is not. This is what is meant by the thesis, attributed to Socrates by Aristotle, that virtue is a form of knowledge.
Socrates’ conception of virtue as a form of knowledge explains why he takes it to be of the greatest importance to seek answers to questions such as “What is courage?” and “What is piety?” If we could just discover the answers to these questions, we would have all we need to live our lives well. The fact that Socrates achieved a complete rational control of his emotions no doubt encouraged him to suppose that his own case was indicative of what human beings at their best can achieve.
But if virtue is a form of knowledge, does that mean that each of the virtues—courage, piety, justice—constitutes a separate branch of knowledge, and should we infer that it is possible to acquire knowledge of one of these branches but not of the others? This is an issue that emerges in several of Plato’s dialogues; it is most fully discussed in Protagoras. It was a piece of conventional Greek wisdom, and is still widely assumed, that one can have some admirable qualities but lack others. One might, for example, be courageous but unjust. Socrates challenges this assumption; he believes that the many virtues form a kind of unity—though, not being able to define any of the virtues, he is in no position to say whether they are all the same thing or instead constitute some looser kind of unification. But he unequivocally rejects the conventional idea that one can possess one virtue without possessing them all.
Another prominent feature of the personality of Socrates, one that often creates problems about how best to interpret him, is (to use the ancient Greek term) his eirôneia. Although this is the term from which the English word irony is derived, there is a difference between the two. To speak ironically is to use words to mean the opposite of what they normally convey, but it is not necessarily to aim at deception, for the speaker may expect and even want the audience to recognize this reversal. In contrast, for the ancient Greeks eirôneia meant “dissembling”—a user of eirôneia is trying to hide something. This is the accusation that is made against Socrates several times in Plato’s works (though never in Xenophon’s). Socrates says in Plato’s Apology, for example, that the jurors hearing his case will not accept the reason he offers for being unable to stop his philosophizing in the marketplace—that to do so would be to disobey the god who presides at Delphi. (Socrates’ audience understood him to be referring to Apollo, though he does not himself use this name. Throughout his speech, he affirms his obedience to the god or to the gods but not specifically to one or more of the familiar gods or goddesses of the Greek pantheon). The cause of their incredulity, he adds, will be their assumption that he is engaging in eirôneia. In effect, Socrates is admitting that he has acquired a reputation for insincerity—for giving people to understand that his words mean what they are ordinarily taken to mean when in fact they do not. Similarly, in Book I of Republic, Socrates is accused by a hostile interlocutor, Thrasymachus, of “habitual eirôneia.” Although Socrates says that he does not have a good answer to the question “What is justice?,” Thrasymachus thinks that this is just a pose. Socrates, he alleges, is concealing his favoured answer. And in Symposium, Alcibiades accuses Socrates of “spending his whole life engaged in eirôneia and playing with people” and compares him to a carved figurine whose outer shell conceals its inner contents. The heart of Alcibiades’ accusation is that Socrates pretends to care about people and to offer them advantages but withholds what he knows because he is full of disdain.
Plato’s portrayal of Socrates as an “ironist” shows how conversation with him could easily lead to a frustrating impasse and how the possibility of resentment was ever present. Socrates was in this sense a masked interlocutor—an aspect of his self-presentation that made him more fascinating and alluring to his audiences but that also added to their distrust and suspicion. And readers, who come to know Socrates through the intervention of Plato, are in somewhat the same situation. Our efforts to interpret him are sometimes not as sound as we would like, because we must rely on judgments, often difficult to justify, about when he means what he says and when he does not.
Even when Socrates goes to court to defend himself against the most serious of charges, he seems to be engaged in eirôneia. After listening to the speeches given by his accusers, he says, in the opening sentence of Plato’s Apology: “I was almost carried away in spite of myself, so persuasively did they speak.” Is this the habitual eirôneia of Socrates? Or did the speeches of his accusers really have this effect on him? It is difficult to be sure. But, by Socrates’ own admission, the suspicion that anything he says might be a pose undermines his ability to persuade the jurors of his good intentions. His eirôneia may even have lent support to one of the accusations made against him, that he corrupted the young. For if Socrates really did engage in eirôneia, and if his youthful followers delighted in and imitated this aspect of his character, then to that extent he encouraged them to become dissembling and untrustworthy, just like himself.
Background of the trial of Socrates
The trial of Socrates in 399 BCE occurred soon after Athens’s defeat at the hands of Sparta in the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE). Not only were Sparta and Athens military rivals during those years, they also had radically different forms of government. Athens was a democracy: all its adult male citizens were members of the Assembly; many of the city’s offices were filled by lot (election was regarded as undemocratic, because it effectively pronounced some citizens better qualified than others); and its citizens enjoyed a high degree of freedom to live and speak as they liked, provided that they obeyed the law and did nothing to undermine the democracy and the public good. Sparta, by contrast, was a mixed regime based on a complex power-sharing arrangement between various elite groups and ordinary citizens, and it exerted far more control than Athens did over education and the daily life of its citizens.
There was in Athens, particularly among the well-born, wealthy, and young, a degree of admiration for certain aspects of Spartan life and government. These young men, who spent much of their time in the public gymnasia, prided themselves on their toughness, practiced a certain simplicity of style, and grew their hair long—all in imitation of Spartan ways. (As Plato and Xenophon confirm, Socrates himself shared some of these qualities. In Aristophanes’ Birds [414], the young who express their admiration for Sparta are said to be “Socratizing.”) No doubt the fact that Athens, an empire-building city with vast resources and a large population, could not defeat smaller and poorer Sparta—and, in the end, lost its empire to that rival regime—added to the allure of the Spartan political system and way of life.
Ordinary Athenians—people who had to work for a living and did not belong to any of the aristocratic families—were proud of their democratic institutions and the freedoms they enjoyed, and they were well aware that their form of government had internal as well as external enemies and critics. Furthermore, they did not think of civic and religious matters as separate spheres but assumed instead that participation in the religious life of the city, as regulated by democratic institutions, was one of the duties of all citizens and that great harm could come to the city if the gods it recognized were offended or customary religious prohibitions were violated.
Religious scandal and the coup of the oligarchs
During and soon after the war with Sparta, several events revealed how much damage could be done to Athenian democracy by individuals who did not respect the religious customs of the community, who had no allegiance to the institutions of democracy, or who admired their city’s adversary. One night in 415, shortly before a major naval expedition to Sicily was to set sail, many statues of the god Hermes (who protected travelers) were mutilated, presumably by those who wished to prevent the expedition from proceeding. While the matter was being investigated, several men, including one of Socrates’ greatest admirers, Alcibiades—who had sponsored and helped to lead the Sicilian expedition—were accused of mocking a religious ceremony and revealing its sacred secrets to outsiders. Some of them were tried and executed. Alcibiades, who had been charged with involvement in other religious scandals before, was called back from Sicily to face trial. The power of his enemies and the suspicion of him was so great, however, that he decided to escape to Sparta rather than return to Athens to face the likelihood of a death sentence. Athens condemned him and his associates to death in absentia, and he proceeded to offer counsel and leadership to Sparta in its fight against Athens. In 407 he returned to Athens and was cleared of the charges against him, though he never fully regained the trust either of the democrats or their opponents. Alcibiades was only one of many followers of Socrates mentioned in Plato’s dialogues who were involved in the religious scandals of 415.
In 411 a group of 400 opponents of Athenian democracy staged a coup and tried to install an oligarchy, but they were overthrown in the same year and democracy was restored. Some of them, who were associates of Socrates, went into exile after their revolution failed. In 404, soon after the Athenians’ defeat, Sparta installed a group of 30 men (many years later dubbed the Thirty Tyrants) in Athens to establish a far less democratic regime there. The leader of the most extreme wing of this group, Critias, was part of the Socratic circle; so, too, was Charmides, another of the 30. The democrats, many of whom had left Athens when the 30 came to power, defeated them in battle, and democracy was restored the following year. (In Plato’s Apology, Socrates refers to the reign of the 30 and their unsuccessful attempt to implicate him in their crimes.)
The perceived fragility of Athenian democracy
The year in which Socrates was prosecuted, 399, was one in which several other prominent figures were brought to trial in Athens on the charge of impiety. That is unlikely to have been a coincidence; rather, it suggests that there was, at the time, a sense of anxiety about the dangers of religious unorthodoxy and about the political consequences that religious deviation could bring. Two attempts to put an end to Athenian democracy had occurred in recent years, and the religious scandals of 415 were not so far in the past that they would have been forgotten. Because a general amnesty had been negotiated, no one, except the 30 and a few others, could be tried for offenses committed prior to 403, when the 30 were defeated. But this would not have prevented an accusation from being brought against someone who committed a crime after 403. If Socrates had continued, during the years after 403, to engage in the same practices that were so characteristic of him throughout his adult life, then not even the most ardent supporters of the amnesty would have objected to bringing him to trial. And once a trial had begun, it was common practice for prosecutors to mention anything that might be judged prejudicial to the accused. There was no legal custom or court-appointed judge that would have prevented Socrates’ accusers from referring to those of his admirers—Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides, and the like—who at one time had been enemies of democratic Athens or had been associated with religious scandal. The law that Socrates was alleged to have violated was a law against impiety, but in support of that accusation he also was accused of having corrupted the young. His jury might have taken his association with opponents of the democracy, or with persons convicted or suspected of religious crimes, to be grounds for considering him a dangerous man.
The fact that one of those who assisted in the prosecution of Socrates and spoke against him—Anytus—was a prominent democratic leader makes it all the more likely that worries about the future of Athenian democracy lay behind Socrates’ trial. And even if neither Anytus nor the other prosecutors (Meletus and Lycon) harboured such fears, it is hard to believe that they were entirely absent from the minds of those who heard his case. In any event, because Socrates openly displayed his antidemocratic ideas in his defense speech, it would have been difficult for jurors to set aside his association with opponents of the democracy, even if they had been inclined to do so. Athenian democracy must have seemed extremely fragile in 399. It is only with the benefit of hindsight that we can see that its institutions were strong enough to last most of the rest of the 4th century.
It is not known with certainty whether those who prosecuted Socrates mentioned Alcibiades and Critias at his trial—there is no record of their speeches, and it is difficult to interpret the evidence about what they did say. But it is very likely that specific names were mentioned. In Plato’s Apology, Socrates notes that his accusers alleged of certain individuals that they were his students, an accusation he lamely denies on the grounds that, because he has never undertaken to teach anyone, he cannot have had students. Furthermore, Xenophon reports in Memorabilia that, according to “the accuser,” Alcibiades and Critias were followers of Socrates. The word accuser is taken by some scholars to be a reference to one of the three persons who spoke against Socrates in 399, though others take Xenophon to be defending Socrates against charges made against him in a pamphlet written several years later by Polycrates, a teacher of rhetoric. In any event, many years later, in the 4th century, the orator Aeschines, in his speech “Against Timarchus,” asserted in public that Socrates was convicted because he was “shown to have been the teacher of Critias, one of the thirty who had overthrown the democracy.”
But even if Socrates’ association with Critias and Alcibiades was an important factor leading to his trial and conviction, it certainly was not the only ingredient of the case against him, nor even the most important one. The law that Socrates was alleged to have violated was a law against impiety, and the thrust of his defense, as presented by Plato, was that his life has been consumed by his single-minded devotion to the god. The Socrates who speaks to us in Plato’s Apology has no doubt that the charge of impiety against him must be refuted. There is no reason to suspect that this charge was a mere pretext and that what Socrates was really being prosecuted for was his antidemocratic associations and ideas. The political background of his trial is important because it helps to explain why he was not prosecuted in the 430s or 420s or at any other time of his life. Everything known about him indicates that he was the same man, and lived the same sort of life, in 399 and in 423, the year of Clouds. What made him the object of prosecution in 399, after so many years during which his behaviour was tolerated, was a change in political circumstances. But it remains the case, according to the Socrates of Apology, that his alleged religious unorthodoxy was deeply worrying to his prosecutors and jurors. That is why this allegation receives all his attention.
The Athenian ideal of free speech
That Socrates was prosecuted because of his religious ideas and political associations indicates how easily an ideal held dear by his fellow Athenians—the ideal of open and frank speech among citizens—could be set aside when they felt insecure. This ideal and its importance in Athens are well illustrated by the remark of the orator Demosthenes, that in Athens one is free to praise the Spartan constitution, whereas in Sparta it is only the Spartan constitution that one is allowed to praise. Were there other instances, besides the trial of Socrates, in which an Athenian was prosecuted in court because of the dangerous ideas he was alleged to have circulated? Centuries after Socrates’ death, several writers alleged that many other intellectual figures of his time—including Protagoras, Anaxagoras, Damon, Aspasia, and Diagoras—were exiled or prosecuted. Several scholars have concluded that Athens’s allegiance to the ideal of freedom of speech was deeply compromised during the last decades of the 5th century. Others have argued that much or all of the evidence for a period of persecution and harassment was invented by writers who wanted to claim, as a badge of honour for their favourite philosophers, that they, too, like the universally admired Socrates, had been persecuted by the Athenians. What can safely be said is this: the trial of Socrates is the only case in which we can be certain that an Athenian was legally prosecuted not for an overt act that directly harmed the public or some individual—such as treason, corruption, or slander—but for alleged harm indirectly caused by the expression and teaching of ideas.
According to Plato’s Apology, the vote to convict Socrates was very close: had 30 of those who voted for conviction cast their ballots differently, he would have been acquitted. (So he was convicted by a majority of 59. Assuming, as many scholars do, that the size of his jury was 501, 280 favoured conviction and 221 opposed it.) It is reasonable to speculate that many of those who opposed conviction did so partly because, however little they cared for what Socrates thought and how he lived, they cherished the freedom of speech enjoyed by all Athenians and attached more importance to this aspect of their political system than to any harm Socrates may have done in the past or might do in the future. The Athenian love of free speech allowed Socrates to cajole and criticize his fellow citizens for the whole of his long life but gave way—though just barely—when it was put under great pressure.
Plato’s Apology
Although in none of Plato’s dialogues is Plato himself a conversational partner or even a witness to a conversation, in the Apology Socrates says that Plato is one of several friends in the audience. In this way Plato lets us know that he was an eyewitness of the trial and therefore in the best possible position to write about it. The other account we have of the trial, that of Xenophon, a contemporary of Socrates, is of a very different character. We know that Xenophon was not present as a live witness. He tells his readers that he is reporting only a portion of Socrates’ speech and that he learned about the trial from Hermogenes, a member of the Socratic circle.
It is not surprising, then, that there are significant differences between Plato’s and Xenophon’s accounts of what was said at the trial. (Xenophon, for example, dwells on the troubles of old age from which Socrates is escaping by being condemned to death, whereas Plato barely alludes to Socrates’ age.) Of greater importance is the fact that the two Apologys agree in many details. They agree about what the charges against Socrates were: failing to acknowledge the gods recognized by the city, introducing other new divinities, and corrupting the young. They also agree that Meletus supported his accusation by referring to a divine voice or sign that Socrates claimed as his personal guide; that Socrates acknowledged the guidance of this divine sign in his speech; that part of Socrates’ defense consisted of a cross-examination of Meletus; that Socrates referred to an inquiry made by his friend, Chaerephon, to the Delphic oracle; that the response of the oracle confirmed that a unique status had been conferred upon Socrates by the gods; that, having been found guilty, Socrates refused to propose a punishment that the jury would find acceptable; and that, after the jury voted in favour of the death penalty, he once again addressed the jury and expressed no regrets for his manner of living or the course of his trial. There is no reason to suppose that Xenophon had learned of these aspects of the trial from Plato. His agreement with Plato about these matters assures us that they are not fabrications.
But can we go so far as to say that in Plato’s Apology there is a word-for-word transcription (or something close to it) of the speech Socrates gave in his defense? It would not have been impossible for Plato to have managed such a feat by taking extensive notes, comparing his memory with that of others, and gradually perfecting a rendition that aimed at replicating the original as closely as possible. Unfortunately, there is no way to prove that Plato was striving to achieve this kind and degree of accuracy. Some scholars, in fact, have argued that Plato was engaged in a much different project: his Apology, they have noted, is similar in many respects to the works of contemporary orators and teachers of rhetoric—in particular to a rhetorical exercise, “Defense of Palamades,” by Gorgias—and they infer that in composing the Apology in this fashion Plato was not seeking historical accuracy but instead striving to outdo or to parody the orators for whom he felt disdain. But this hypothesis is just as speculative as the supposition that Plato strove to record as accurately as possible the actual speech of Socrates.
We cannot eliminate the possibility that some parts of the speech Plato wrote were not actually delivered at the trial or were expressed rather differently. Plato’s speech represents his creative attempt to defend Socrates and his way of life and to condemn those who voted to kill him. In fact, Plato’s motives in writing the Apology are likely to have been complex. One of them, no doubt, was to defend and praise Socrates by making use of many of the points Socrates himself had offered in his speech. But, as any reader of the work can see, Plato is at the same time using the trial and death of Socrates to condemn Athens, to call upon his readers to reject the conventional life that Athens would have preferred Socrates to lead, and to choose instead the life of a Socratic philosopher. In the 4th century BCE Athens had no norm of accurate reportage or faithful biography, and so Plato would have felt free to shape his material in whatever way suited his multiple aims. Because it was Socrates he wished to praise, he had no choice but to make the Socrates of the Apology close to the original. But he would not have felt bound merely to reproduce, as best he could, the speech that Socrates delivered.
In any event, the historical accuracy of Plato’s Apology should not be the only question on the reader’s mind. Of equal importance is whether Plato’s Socrates really is guilty of the charges brought against him, whether he is a wholly just and admirable person, whether his manner of living is the one that is most worthwhile (or perhaps even the only one that is worthwhile at all, as Socrates insists), and whether there is any reason for a political community to be concerned about the harm such a person might do. Surely the last thing Plato would have wanted his readers to do with the Apology is to ignore its philosophical, religious, and political dimensions in order to concentrate solely on its accuracy as a piece of historical reportage.
The public’s hatred of Socrates
Part of the fascination of Plato’s Apology consists in the fact that it presents a man who takes extraordinary steps throughout his life to be of the greatest possible value to his community but whose efforts, far from earning him the gratitude and honour he thinks he deserves, lead to his condemnation and death at the hands of the very people he seeks to serve. Socrates is painfully aware that he is a hated figure and that this is what has led to the accusations against him. He has little money and no political savvy or influence, and he has paid little attention to his family and household—all in order to serve the public that now reviles him. What went wrong?
The impression created by Aristophanes
Socrates goes to some length to answer this question. Much of his defense consists not merely in refuting the charges but in offering a complex explanation of why such false accusations should have been brought against him in the first place. Part of the explanation, he believes, is that he has long been misunderstood by the general public. The public, he says, has focused its distrust of certain types of people upon him. He claims that the false impressions of his “first accusers” (as he calls them) derive from a play of Aristophanes (he is referring to Clouds) in which a character called Socrates is seen “swinging about, saying he was walking on air and talking a lot of nonsense about things of which I know nothing at all.” The Socrates of Aristophanes’ comedy is the head of a school that investigates every sort of empirical phenomenon, regards clouds and air as divine substances, denies the existence of any gods but these, studies language and the art of argument, and uses its knowledge of rhetorical devices to “make the worse into the stronger argument,” as the Socrates of the Apology puts it in his speech. Socrates’ corruption of the young is also a major theme of Clouds: it features a father (Strepsiades) who attends Socrates’ school with his son (Pheidippides) in order to learn how to avoid paying the debts he has incurred because of his son’s extravagance. In the end, Pheidippides learns all too well how to use argumentative skills to his advantage; indeed, he prides himself on his ability to prove that it is right for a son to beat his parents. In the end, Strepsiades denounces Socrates and burns down the building that houses his school.
This play, Socrates says, has created the general impression that he studies celestial and geographic phenomena and, like the Sophists who travel from city to city, takes a fee for teaching the young various skills. Not so, says Socrates. He thinks it would be a fine thing to possess the kinds of knowledge these Sophists claim to teach, but he has never discussed these matters with anyone—as his judges should be able to confirm for themselves, because, he says, many of them have heard his conversations.
The human resistance to self-reflection
But this can only be the beginning of Socrates’ explanation, for it leads to further questions. Why should Aristophanes have written in this way about Socrates? The latter must have been a well-known figure in 423, when Clouds was produced, for Aristophanes typically wrote about and mocked figures who already were familiar to his audience. Furthermore, if, as Socrates claims, many of his jurors had heard him in discussion and could therefore confirm for themselves that he did not study or teach others about clouds, air, and other such matters and did not take a fee as the Sophists did, then why did they not vote to acquit him of the charges by an overwhelming majority?
Socrates provides answers to these questions. Long before Aristophanes wrote about him, he had acquired a reputation among his fellow citizens because he spent his days attempting to fulfill his divine mission to cross-examine them and to puncture their confident belief that they possessed knowledge of the most important matters. Socrates tells the jurors that, as a result of his inquiries, he has learned a bitter lesson about his fellow citizens: not only do they fail to possess the knowledge they claim to have, but they resent having this fact pointed out to them, and they hate him for his insistence that his reflective way of life and his disavowal of knowledge make him superior to them. The only people who delight in his conversation are the young and wealthy, who have the leisure to spend their days with him. These people imitate him by carrying out their own cross-examinations of their elders. Socrates does admit, then, that he has, to some degree, set one generation against another—and in making this confession, he makes it apparent why some members of the jury may have been convinced, on the basis of their own acquaintance with him, that he has corrupted the city’s young.
One of the most subtle components of Socrates’ explanation for the hatred he has aroused is his point that people hide the shame they feel when they are unable to withstand his destructive arguments. His reputation as a corrupter of the young and as a Sophist and an atheist is sustained because it provides people with an ostensibly reasonable explanation of their hatred of him. No one will say, “I hate Socrates because I cannot answer his questions, and he makes me look foolish in front of the young.” Instead, people hide their shame and the real source of their anger by seizing on the general impression that he is the sort of philosopher who casts doubt on traditional religion and teaches people rhetorical tricks that can be used to make bad arguments look good. These ways of hiding the source of their hatred are all the more potent because they contain at least a grain of truth. Socrates, as both Plato and Xenophon confirm, is a man who loves to argue: in that respect he is like a Sophist. And his conception of piety, as revealed by his devotion to the Delphic oracle, is highly unorthodox: in that respect he is like those who deny the existence of the gods.
Socrates believes that this hatred, whose real source is so painful for people to acknowledge, played a crucial role in leading Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon to come forward in court against him; it also makes it so difficult for many members of the jury to acknowledge that he has the highest motives and has done his city a great service. Aristophanes’ mockery of Socrates and the legal indictment against him could not possibly have led to his trial or conviction were it not for something in a large number of his fellow Athenians that wanted to be rid of him. This is a theme to which Socrates returns several times. He compares himself, at one point, to a gadfly who has been assigned by the god to stir a large and sluggish horse. Note what this implies: the bite of the fly cannot be anything but painful, and it is only natural that the horse would like nothing better than to kill it. After the jury has voted in favour of the death penalty, Socrates tells them that their motive has been their desire to avoid giving a defense of their lives. Something in people resists self-examination: they do not want to answer deep questions about themselves, and they hate those who cajole them for not doing so or for doing so poorly. At bottom, Socrates thinks that all but a few people will strike out against those who try to stimulate serious moral reflection in them. That is why he thinks that his trial is not merely the result of unfortuitous events—a mere misunderstanding caused by the work of a popular playwright—but the outcome of psychological forces deep within human nature.
Socrates’ criticism of democracy
Socrates’ analysis of the hatred he has incurred is one part of a larger theme that he dwells on throughout his speech. Athens is a democracy, a city in which the many are the dominant power in politics, and it can therefore be expected to have all the vices of the many. Because most people hate to be tested in argument, they will always take action of some sort against those who provoke them with questions. But that is not the only accusation Socrates brings forward against his city and its politics. He tells his democratic audience that he was right to have withdrawn from political life, because a good person who fights for justice in a democracy will be killed. In his cross-examination of Meletus, he insists that only a few people can acquire the knowledge necessary for improving the young of any species, and that the many will inevitably do a poor job. He criticizes the Assembly for its illegal actions and the Athenian courts for the ease with which matters of justice are distorted by emotional pleading. Socrates implies that the very nature of democracy makes it a corrupt political system. Bitter experience has taught him that most people rest content with a superficial understanding of the most urgent human questions. When they are given great power, their shallowness inevitably leads to injustice.
The charge of impiety
Socrates spends a large part of his speech trying to persuade his fellow citizens that he is indeed a pious man, because his philosophical mission has been carried out in obedience to the god who presides at Delphi. It is remarkable that this is nearly the only positive argument he offers, in Plato’s Apology, to support his claim that he is a pious man. The only other evidence he supplies is introduced only because Meletus, upon cross-examination, asserts that Socrates believes that there are no gods or divinities at all, an accusation far more sweeping than—and indeed contradictory to—the official indictment, which asserted that Socrates did not acknowledge the gods recognized by the city but instead believed in different and new gods. Socrates quickly points out the absurdity of this new accusation. Meletus, he notes, has referred in his speech to a certain strange divinity (daimon) who comes to Socrates to give him advice. Presumably Meletus has offered this as evidence that Socrates believes in new gods that are different from the ones generally recognized in Athens. But if Meletus admits that Socrates is guided by a divine being, then he cannot be taken seriously when he also says that Socrates is a complete atheist.
Socrates’ radical reconception of piety
These two modes of Socrates’ religiosity—serving the god by cross-examining one’s fellow citizens and accepting the guidance of a divine voice—are nothing like the conventional forms of piety with which Socrates’ contemporaries were familiar. The Athenians, like all Greeks in the ancient world, expressed their piety by participating in festivals, making sacrifices, visiting shrines, and the like. They assumed that it was the better part of caution to show one’s devotion to the gods in these public and conventional ways because, if the gods were not honoured, they could easily harm or destroy even the best of men and women and their families and cities as well. The Socrates of Plato’s Apology does not refer to his participation in these ceremonies and rituals. (The Socrates of Xenophon’s Apology does, however, and, in this and many other ways, Plato’s Socrates is the more unconventional and provocative of the two and a figure more likely to be hated and feared.) It is impossible to know whether the historical Socrates participated fully (or at all) in conventional forms of religious observance, but, if Plato’s account of his philosophy is accurate, then Socrates lacked the typical Athenian’s motives for doing so. He cannot believe that the gods might harm him, because he is confident that he is a good man and that a good man cannot be harmed. That is why he has no fear of other human beings. Even if the jury votes to banish him from Athens or to kill him, he will not be worse off, because his peculiar kind of wisdom and virtue—his acknowledgment of his ignorance and commitment to continual self-examination—will remain intact. That is also why he is sure that, when he dies, his affairs will not be neglected by the gods. They must be entirely benign in their attitude toward someone like him, who has served them so well, and so he has no need to offer them gifts, if gifts are a device for incurring their favour or protecting oneself from their destructive power.
In effect, then, Socrates admits that his understanding of piety is radically different from the conventional conception. In keeping with his conception of virtue as a form of knowledge he uses an intellectual test, not merely a ceremonial test, to determine whether someone is pious. You may participate in the conventional practices of civic religion, but can you say what piety is? If you cannot, do you at least admit your ignorance and search constantly for a better understanding of piety, as the god wishes you to do? More generally, though you may think you are a good person, can you say what your virtues consist of? If you cannot, and if you do not spend your life trying, then your goodness is a sham.
Socrates’ reconception of piety must have struck his fellow citizens as all the more bizarre and threatening because it was accompanied by his unapologetic and grateful acceptance of the divine sign, which Meletus ridicules—a voice that has come to him since childhood, warning him away from certain undertakings and in doing so giving him unfailing advice. In Xenophon’s Apology, Socrates seeks to portray the daimon that guides him as a phenomenon akin to others with which his fellow citizens are quite familiar: “Those who rely on bird-calls and the utterances of men are, I suppose, receiving guidance from voices. Can there be any doubt that thunder has a voice or that it is an omen of the greatest significance?” But an Athenian of conventional piety would have been able to spot the weakness of this attempt to assimilate Socrates’ divine voice to the experience of a seer who makes predictions based on the interpretation of natural phenomena. Such seers were appointed and regulated by civic procedures. Socrates was not designated by the city to serve in an official religious capacity, and therefore, in claiming to have experiences that put him directly in touch with the divine, he was circumventing the normal route by which citizens gained access to the sources of religious inspiration. The Socrates of Plato’s Apology, unlike that of Xenophon’s, makes no attempt to portray his divine sign as a phenomenon that can create no rift or distance between himself and others. On the contrary, he attributes his decision not to participate in the political life of the community beyond the minimal duties of citizenship to the influence of his divine sign, and he is confident that his decision to come to court and contest the charges against him (leaving the city and living in exile was an option) was the right one because it was not opposed by the divine sign. The daimon Socrates listens to is a divinity that makes a political difference: it tells him what kind of relationship he should have with his fellow citizens and how he should conduct himself in public affairs. Thus, not only does Socrates have an unorthodox conception of piety and of what the gods want from the citizens of the city, but also he claims to receive infallible guidance from a voice that does not hesitate to speak to him about public matters.
The danger posed by Socrates
An open-minded and conscientious member of the jury could therefore have come to the conclusion that Socrates posed a significant threat to the city and should be found guilty of the charges against him. In a way, Socrates did fail to acknowledge the gods recognized by the city, he did introduce new gods, and, by teaching these things to the young who gathered around him, he did corrupt them. He may have referred to “the god” or “the gods,” but his conception of what is involved in attending to the gods was utterly novel and politically dangerous. The fact that Socrates saw his piety as the genuine article, and the unreflective virtue of his fellow citizens as false virtue, indicates that he took the entire religious life of Athens, no less than its political life, to be unworthy of a good man.
If there is any doubt that the unorthodox form of piety Socrates embodies could have brought him into direct conflict with the popular will, one need only think of the portion of Plato’s Apology in which Socrates tells the jurors that he would obey the god rather than them. Imagining the possibility that he is acquitted on the condition that he cease philosophizing in the marketplace, he unequivocally rejects the terms of this hypothetical offer, precisely because he believes that his religious duty to call his fellow citizens to the examined life cannot be made secondary to any other consideration: “Men of Athens, I salute you and hold you dear, but I will obey the god rather than you, and so long as I take breath and am able, I will never cease philosophizing.” But there was no need for him to have admitted, in such explicit terms, that his conception of piety might require him, in certain circumstances, to disobey a civic order. It is characteristic of his entire speech that he brings into the open how contemptuous he is of Athenian civic life and his fellow citizens. He prides himself on the fact that he will say nothing to curry favour with the jurors or to conceal his attitude of superiority to them—even though he realizes that this is likely to lead some of them to vote against him out of resentment. Others may throw themselves on the pity of the jury or bring their tearful children and friends to court; but these typical modes of behaviour corrupt the legal system, and Socrates will not stoop to such tactics. Here, as in so many parts of his speech, he treats his day in court as an opportunity to counter-indict his accusers and his fellow citizens (those, at any rate, who voted against him) for the way they lead their lives. (Another example: after he has been found guilty and has the opportunity to propose a punishment, he tells the jury that he should receive free meals for the remainder of his life, because this is what he deserves—though in the end he offers to pay one mina of silver, equivalent to about one hundred days’ wages, a penalty that his wealthy friends attending the trial increase to 30 minas.) In effect, Socrates uses the occasion of his trial to put his accusers and the jurors on trial. But this was a natural role for him, because he had done the same thing, day after day, to everyone he met.
Socrates versus Plato
We can conclude that Plato was not blind to the civic and religious dangers created by Socrates. Part of what makes his Apology so complex and gripping is that it is not a one-sided encomium that conceals the features of the Socratic way of life that lay behind the anxiety and resentment felt by many of his fellow citizens. Plato, of course, leaves no doubt that he sides with Socrates and against Athens, but in doing so he allows us to see why Socrates had enemies as well as friends. The multisidedness of Plato’s portrait adds to its verisimilitude and should increase our confidence in him as a source of our understanding of the historical Socrates. A defense of Socrates that portrayed him as an innocuous preacher of moral pieties would have left us wondering why he was sentenced to death, and indeed why anyone bothered to indict him in the first place.
Plato gives no hint in his Apology that he had any reservations about the way Socrates led his life or the doctrines that guided him; the format of the Apology prevents him from doing so. He has made the decision to let Socrates speak for himself in this work and to refrain from offering any of his own reflections on the justice or injustice of the charges against his teacher. But, in the Republic, he puts into the mouth of its principal interlocutor, “Socrates,” an observation about the corrosive power that philosophy can have when it takes hold at too early an age. When young people first hear philosophical questions about the traditional moral standards they have learned from their parents and their community, and when they see that it is difficult to defend these orthodoxies without falling into contradiction, they are prone to reject all traditional morality and to become essentially lawless. For this reason, philosophy may come to be seen as a dangerous and disreputable pursuit. The Socrates of the Republic therefore suggests that in an ideal society the young should not be exposed to ethical doubt until they are well into their maturity. This, of course, is not a restriction that the historical Socrates imposed on himself. In Plato’s Apology, Socrates prides himself on addressing his questions to every Athenian—no one, in his view, is too young or too old for the examined life—and he freely acknowledges that the young love to see their elders embarrassed when they are unable to defend their beliefs. Whereas the Socrates of Plato’s Apology assumes that there is no need to place limits on philosophical inquiry, the Socrates of the Republic—who speaks as the mouthpiece of Plato—holds that in an ideal society this kind of activity would be carefully regulated. Similarly, in Plato’s Laws, the main speaker, an unnamed visitor from Athens, praises Sparta and Crete for forbidding the young to criticize the laws of their communities. Plato’s great admiration for Socrates was all the more remarkable because it coexisted not only with a recognition of why Socrates was considered dangerous but also with his belief that Socrates was, to some degree, guilty of impiety and of corrupting the young.
The legacy of Socrates
Socrates’ thought was so pregnant with possibilities, his mode of life so provocative, that he inspired a remarkable variety of responses. One of his associates, Aristippus of Cyrene—his followers were called “Cyrenaics,” and their school flourished for a century and a half—affirmed that pleasure is the highest good. (Socrates seems to endorse this thesis in Plato’s Protagoras, but he attacks it in Gorgias and other dialogues.) Another prominent follower of Socrates in the early 4th century BCE, Antisthenes, emphasized the Socratic doctrine that a good man cannot be harmed; virtue, in other words, is by itself sufficient for happiness. That doctrine played a central role in a school of thought, founded by Diogenes of Sinope, that had an enduring influence on Greek and Roman philosophy: Cynicism. Like Socrates, Diogenes was concerned solely with ethics, practiced his philosophy in the marketplace, and upheld an ideal of indifference to material possessions, political power, and conventional honours. But the Cynics, unlike Socrates, treated all conventional distinctions and cultural traditions as impediments to the life of virtue. They advocated a life in accordance with nature and regarded animals and human beings who did not live in societies as being closer to nature than contemporary human beings. (The term cynic is derived from the Greek word for dog. Cynics, therefore, live like beasts.) Starting from the Socratic premise that virtue is sufficient for happiness, they launched attacks on marriage, the family, national distinctions, authority, and cultural achievements. But the two most important ancient schools of thought that were influenced by Socrates were Stoicism, founded by Zeno of Citium, and Skepticism, which became, for many centuries, the reigning philosophical stance of Plato’s Academy after Arcesilaus became its leader in 273 BCE. The influence of Socrates on Zeno was mediated by the Cynics, but Roman Stoics—particularly Epictetus—regarded Socrates as the paradigm of sagacious inner strength, and they invented new arguments for the Socratic thesis that virtue is sufficient for happiness. The Stoic doctrine that divine intelligence pervades the world and rules for the best borrows heavily from ideas attributed to Socrates by Xenophon in the Memorabilia.
Like Socrates, Arcesilaus wrote nothing. He philosophized by inviting others to state a thesis; he would then prove, by Socratic questioning, that their thesis led to a contradiction. His use of the Socratic method allowed Arcesilaus and his successors in the Academy to hold that they were remaining true to the central theme of Plato’s writings. But, just as Cynicism took Socratic themes in a direction Socrates himself had not developed and indeed would have rejected, so, too, Arcesilaus and his Skeptical followers in Plato’s Academy used the Socratic method to advocate a general suspension of all convictions whatsoever and not merely a disavowal of knowledge. The underlying thought of the Academy during its Skeptical phase is that, because there is no way to distinguish truth from falsity, we must refrain from believing anything at all. Socrates, by contrast, merely claims to have no knowledge, and he regards certain theses as far more worthy of our credence than their denials.
Although Socrates exerted a profound influence on Greek and Roman thought, not every major philosopher of antiquity regarded him as a moral exemplar or a major thinker. Aristotle approves of the Socratic search for definitions but criticizes Socrates for an overintellectualized conception of the human psyche. The followers of Epicurus, who were philosophical rivals of the Stoics and Academics, were contemptuous of him.
With the ascendancy of Christianity in the medieval period, the influence of Socrates was at its nadir: he was, for many centuries, little more than an Athenian who had been condemned to death. But when Greek texts, and thus the works of Plato, the Stoics, and the Skeptics, became increasingly available in the Renaissance, the thought and personality of Socrates began to play an important role in European philosophy. From the 16th to the 19th century the instability and excesses of Athenian democracy became a common motif of political writers; the hostility of Xenophon and Plato, fed by the death of Socrates, played an important role here. Comparisons between Socrates and Christ became commonplace, and they remained so even into the 20th century—though the contrasts drawn between them, and the uses to which their similarities were put, varied greatly from one author and period to another. The divine sign of Socrates became a matter of controversy: was he truly inspired by the voice of God? Or was the sign only an intuitive and natural grasp of virtue? (So thought Montaigne.) Did he intend to undermine the irrational and merely conventional aspects of religious practice and thus to place religion on a scientific footing? (So thought the 18th-century Deists.)
In the 19th century Socrates was regarded as a seminal figure in the evolution of European thought or as a Christ-like herald of a higher existence. G.W.F. Hegel saw in Socrates a decisive turn from pre-reflective moral habits to a self-consciousness that, tragically, had not yet learned how to reconcile itself to universal civic standards. Søren Kierkegaard, whose dissertation examined Socratic irony, found in Socrates a pagan anticipation of his belief that Christianity is a lived doctrine of almost impossible demands; but he also regarded Socratic irony as a deeply flawed indifference to morality. Friedrich Nietzsche struggled throughout his writings against the one-sided rationalism and the destruction of cultural forms that he found in Socrates.
In contrast, in Victorian England Socrates was idealized by utilitarian thinkers as a Christ-like martyr who laid the foundations of a modern, rational, scientific worldview. John Stuart Mill mentions the legal executions of Socrates and of Christ in the same breath in order to call attention to the terrible consequences of allowing common opinion to persecute unorthodox thinkers. Benjamin Jowett, the principal translator of Plato in the late 19th century, told his students at Oxford, “The two biographies about which we are most deeply interested (though not to the same degree) are those of Christ and Socrates.” Such comparisons continued into the 20th century: Socrates is treated as a “paradigmatic individual” (along with Buddha, Confucius, and Christ) by the German existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers.
The conflict between Socrates and Athenian democracy shaped the thought of 20th-century political philosophers such as Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, and Karl Popper. The tradition of self-reflection and care of the self initiated by Socrates fascinated Michel Foucault in his later writings. Analytic philosophy, an intellectual tradition that traces its origins to the work of Gottlob Frege, G.E. Moore, and Bertrand Russell in the late 19th and early 20th century, uses, as one of its fundamental tools, a process called “conceptual analysis,” a form of nonempirical inquiry that bears some resemblance to Socrates’ search for definitions.
But the influence of Socrates is felt not only among philosophers and others inside the academy. He remains, for all of us, a challenge to complacency and a model of integrity.
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Socrates (/ˈsɒkrətiːz/;[2] Ancient Greek: Σωκράτης, romanized: Sōkrátēs; c. 470 – 399 BC) was an ancient Greek philosopher from Classical Athens, perhaps the first Western moral philosopher, and a major inspiration on his student Plato, who largely founded the tradition of Western philosophy.[3] An enigmatic figure, Socrates authored no texts and is known mainly through the posthumous accounts of classical writers, particularly his students Plato and Xenophon. These accounts are written as dialogues, in which Socrates and his interlocutors examine a subject in the style of question and answer; they gave rise to the Socratic dialogue literary genre. Contradictory accounts of Socrates make a reconstruction of his philosophy nearly impossible, a situation known as the Socratic problem. Socrates was a polarizing figure in Athenian society. In 399 BC, he was accused of impiety and corrupting the youth. After a trial that lasted a day, he was sentenced to death. As related by Plato, he was put to death by administration of poison after refusing offers from allies to help him escape.
Plato's dialogues are among the most comprehensive accounts of Socrates to survive from antiquity. They demonstrate the Socratic approach to areas of philosophy including epistemology and ethics. The Platonic Socrates lends his name to the concept of the Socratic method, and also to Socratic irony. The Socratic method of questioning, or elenchus, takes shape in dialogue using short questions and answers, epitomized by those Platonic texts in which Socrates and his interlocutors examine various aspects of an issue or an abstract meaning, usually relating to one of the virtues, and find themselves at an impasse, unable to define what they thought they understood. Socrates frequently proclaims his ignorance, saying that he is only sure that he does not know.
Socrates exerted a strong influence on philosophers in later antiquity and has continued to do so in the modern era. He was studied by medieval and Islamic scholars and played an important role in the thought of the Italian Renaissance, particularly within the humanist movement. Interest in him continued unabated, as reflected in the works of Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche. Depictions of Socrates in art, literature, and popular culture have made him a widely known figure in the Western philosophical tradition.
Sources and the Socratic problem
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Socrates did not document his teachings. All that is known about him comes from the accounts of others: mainly the philosopher Plato and the historian Xenophon, who were both his pupils; the Athenian comic dramatist Aristophanes (Socrates's contemporary); and Plato's pupil Aristotle, who was born after Socrates's death. The often contradictory stories from these ancient accounts only serve to complicate scholars' ability to reconstruct Socrates's true thoughts reliably, a predicament known as the Socratic problem.[4] The works of Plato, Xenophon, and other authors who use the character of Socrates as an investigative tool, are written in the form of a dialogue between Socrates and his interlocutors and provide the main source of information on Socrates's life and thought. Socratic dialogues (logos sokratikos) was a term coined by Aristotle to describe this newly formed literary genre.[5] While the exact dates of their composition are unknown, some were probably written after Socrates's death.[6] As Aristotle first noted, the extent to which the dialogues portray Socrates authentically is a matter of some debate.[7]
Plato and Xenophon
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Xenophon was a student of Socrates. He discusses Socrates in four works: the Memorabilia, the Oeconomicus, the Symposium, and the Apology of Socrates. He also mentions a story featuring Socrates in his Anabasis.[8] Oeconomicus recounts a discussion on practical household management.[citation needed] Like Plato's Apology, Xenophon's Apologia describes the trial of Socrates, but the works diverge substantially and, according to W. K. C. Guthrie, Xenophon's account portrays a Socrates of "intolerable smugness and complacency".[9] Symposium is a dialogue of Socrates with other prominent Athenians during an after-dinner discussion, but is quite different from Plato's Symposium: there is no overlap in the guest list.[citation needed] In Memorabilia, he defends Socrates from the accusations of corrupting the youth and being against the gods; essentially, it is a collection of various stories gathered together to construct a new apology for Socrates.[10]
Plato's representation of Socrates is not straightforward.[11] Plato was a pupil of Socrates and outlived him by five decades.[12] How trustworthy Plato is in representing the attributes of Socrates is a matter of debate; the view that he did not represent views other than Socrates's own is not shared by many contemporary scholars.[13] A driver of this doubt is the inconsistency of the character of Socrates that he presents.[14] One common but not universally accepted account of this inconsistency is that Plato initially tried accurately to represent the historical Socrates, while later in his writings putting his own views into Socrates's mouth. Under this understanding, there is a distinction between the Socratic Socrates of Plato's earlier works and the Platonic Socrates of Plato's later writings, although the boundary between the two seems blurred and the presumed chronology rests on little evidence.[15]
Xenophon's and Plato's accounts differ in their presentations of Socrates as a person. Xenophon's Socrates is duller, less humorous and less ironic than Plato's.[16][17] Xenophon's Socrates also lacks the philosophical features of Plato's Socrates—ignorance, the Socratic method or elenchus—and places more emphasis on enkrateia (self-control) than Plato's Socrates.[18] Generally, logoi Sokratikoi cannot help us to reconstruct the historical Socrates even in cases where their narratives overlap, as authors may have influenced each other's accounts.[19]
Aristophanes and other sources
Writers of Athenian comedy, including Aristophanes, also commented on Socrates. Aristophanes's most important comedy with respect to Socrates is The Clouds, in which Socrates is a central character.[20] In this drama, Aristophanes presents a caricature of Socrates that leans towards sophism,[21] ridiculing Socrates as an absurd atheist.[22] Socrates in Clouds is interested in natural philosophy, which conforms to Plato's depiction of him in Phaedo. What is certain is that by the age of 45, Socrates had already captured the interest of Athenians as a philosopher.[23] It is not clear whether Aristophanes's work is useful in reconstructing the historical Socrates.[24]
Other ancient authors who wrote about Socrates were Aeschines of Sphettus, Antisthenes, Aristippus, Bryson, Cebes, Crito, Euclid of Megara, Phaedo and Aristotle, all of whom wrote after Socrates's death.[25] Aristotle was not a contemporary of Socrates; he studied under Plato at the latter's Academy for twenty years.[26] Aristotle treats Socrates without the bias of Xenophon and Plato, who had an emotional tie with Socrates, and he scrutinizes Socrates's doctrines as a philosopher.[27] Aristotle was familiar with the various written and unwritten stories of Socrates.[28] His role in understanding Socrates is limited. He does not write extensively on Socrates; and, when he does, he is mainly preoccupied with the early dialogues of Plato.[29] There are also general doubts on his reliability on the history of philosophy.[30] Still, his testimony is vital in understanding Socrates.[31]
The Socratic problem
In a seminal work titled "The Worth of Socrates as a Philosopher" (1818), the philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher attacked Xenophon's accounts; his attack was widely accepted.[32] Schleiermacher criticized Xenophon for his naïve representation of Socrates. Xenophon was a soldier, argued Schleiermacher, and was therefore not well placed to articulate Socratic ideas. Furthermore, Xenophon was biased in his depiction of his former friend and teacher: he believed Socrates was treated unfairly by Athens, and sought to prove his point of view rather than to provide an impartial account. The result, said Schleiermacher, was that Xenophon portrayed Socrates as an uninspiring philosopher.[33] By the early twentieth century, Xenophon's account was largely rejected.[34]
The philosopher Karl Joel, basing his arguments on Aristotle's interpretation of logos sokratikos, suggested that the Socratic dialogues are mostly fictional: according to Joel, the dialogues' authors were just mimicking some Socratic traits of dialogue.[35] In the mid-twentieth century, philosophers such as Olof Gigon and Eugène Dupréel, based on Joel's arguments, proposed that the study of Socrates should focus on the various versions of his character and beliefs rather than aiming to reconstruct a historical Socrates.[36] Later, ancient philosophy scholar Gregory Vlastos suggested that the early Socratic dialogues of Plato were more compatible with other evidence for a historical Socrates than his later writings, an argument that is based on inconsistencies in Plato's own evolving depiction of Socrates. Vlastos totally disregarded Xenophon's account except when it agreed with Plato's.[36] More recently, Charles H. Kahn has reinforced the skeptical stance on the unsolvable Socratic problem, suggesting that only Plato's Apology has any historical significance.[37]
Biography
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Socrates was born in 470 or 469 BC to Sophroniscus and Phaenarete, a stoneworker and a midwife, respectively, in the Athenian deme of Alopece; therefore, he was an Athenian citizen, having been born to relatively affluent Athenians.[39] He lived close to his father's relatives and inherited, as was customary, part of his father's estate, securing a life reasonably free of financial concerns.[40] His education followed the laws and customs of Athens. He learned the basic skills of reading and writing and, like most wealthy Athenians, received extra lessons in various other fields such as gymnastics, poetry and music.[41] He was married twice (which came first is not clear): his marriage to Xanthippe took place when Socrates was in his fifties, and another marriage was with a daughter of Aristides, an Athenian statesman.[42] He had three sons with Xanthippe.[43] Socrates fulfilled his military service during the Peloponnesian War and distinguished himself in three campaigns, according to Plato.[44]
Another incident that reflects Socrates's respect for the law is the arrest of Leon the Salaminian. As Plato describes in his Apology, Socrates and four others were summoned to the Tholos and told by representatives of the Thirty Tyrants (which began ruling in 404 BC) to arrest Leon for execution. Again Socrates was the sole abstainer, choosing to risk the tyrants' wrath and retribution rather than to participate in what he considered to be a crime.[45]
Socrates attracted great interest from the Athenian public and especially the Athenian youth.[46] He was notoriously ugly, having a flat turned-up nose, bulging eyes and a large belly; his friends joked about his appearance.[47] Socrates was indifferent to material pleasures, including his own appearance and personal comfort. He neglected personal hygiene, bathed rarely, walked barefoot, and owned only one ragged coat.[48] He moderated his eating, drinking, and sex, although he did not practice full abstention.[48] Although Socrates was attracted to youth, he resisted his passion for them because, as Plato describes, he was more interested in educating their souls and did not seek sex from his disciples.[49][50] Politically, he did not take sides in the rivalry between the democrats and the oligarchs in Athens; he criticized both.[51] The character of Socrates as exhibited in Apology, Crito, Phaedo and Symposium concurs with other sources to an extent that gives confidence in Plato's depiction of Socrates in these works as being representative of the real Socrates.[52]
Socrates died in Athens in 399 BC after a trial for impiety (asebeia) and the corruption of the young.[53] He spent his last day in prison among friends and followers who offered him a route to escape, which he refused. He died the next morning, in accordance with his sentence, after drinking poison hemlock.[54] According to the Phaedo, his last words were: “Crito, we owe a rooster to Asclepius. Don't forget to pay the debt.”[55]
Trial of Socrates
In 399 BC, Socrates was formally accused of corrupting the minds of the youth of Athens, and for asebeia (impiety), i.e. worshipping false gods and failing to worship the gods of Athens.[56] At the trial, Socrates defended himself unsuccessfully. He was found guilty by a majority vote cast by a jury of hundreds of male Athenian citizens and, according to the custom, proposed his own penalty: that he should be given free food and housing by the state for the services he rendered to the city,[57] or alternatively, that he be fined one mina of silver (according to him, all he had).[57] The jurors declined his offer and ordered the death penalty.[57]
Of all the works written about Socrates' trial, only three survive: Plato's Apology, Xenophon's Apology, and Xenophon's Memorabilia.[58]
Socrates was charged in a politically tense climate.[59] In 404 BC, the Athenians had been crushed by Spartans at the decisive naval Battle of Aegospotami, and subsequently, the Spartans laid siege to Athens. They replaced the democratic government with a new, pro-oligarchic government, named the Thirty Tyrants.[59] Because of their tyrannical measures, some Athenians organized to overthrow the Tyrants—and, indeed, they managed to do so briefly—until a Spartan request for aid from the Thirty arrived and a compromise was sought. When the Spartans left again, however, democrats seized the opportunity to kill the oligarchs and reclaim the government of Athens.[59]
The accusations against Socrates were initiated by a poet, Meletus, who asked for the death penalty in accordance with the charge of asebeia.[59] Other accusers were Anytus and Lycon. After a month or two, in late spring or early summer, the trial started and likely went on for most of one day.[59] There were two main sources for the religion-based accusations. First, Socrates had rejected the anthropomorphism of traditional Greek religion by denying that the gods did bad things like humans do. Second, he seemed to believe in a daimonion—an inner voice with, as his accusers suggested, divine origin.[59]
Plato's Apology starts with Socrates answering the various rumours against him that have given rise to the indictment.[60] First, Socrates defends himself against the rumour that he is an atheist naturalist philosopher, as portrayed in Aristophanes's The Clouds; or a sophist.[61] Against the allegations of corrupting the youth, Socrates answers that he has never corrupted anyone intentionally, since corrupting someone would carry the risk of being corrupted back in return, and that would be illogical, since corruption is undesirable.[62] On the second charge, Socrates asks for clarification. Meletus responds by repeating the accusation that Socrates is an atheist. Socrates notes the contradiction between atheism and worshipping false gods.[63] He then claims that he is "God's gift" to the Athenians, since his activities ultimately benefit Athens; thus, in condemning him to death, Athens itself will be the greatest loser.[64] After that, he says that even though no human can reach wisdom, seeking it is the best thing someone can do, implying money and prestige are not as precious as commonly thought.[65]
Socrates was given the chance to offer alternative punishments for himself after being found guilty. He could have requested permission to flee Athens and live in exile, but he did not do so. According to Xenophon, Socrates made no proposals, while according to Plato he suggested free meals should be provided for him daily in recognition of his worth to Athens or, more in earnest, that a fine should be imposed on him.[67] The jurors favoured the death penalty by making him drink a cup of hemlock (a poisonous liquid).[68] In return, Socrates warned jurors and Athenians that criticism of them by his many disciples was inescapable, unless they became good men.[57] After a delay caused by Athenian religious ceremonies, Socrates spent his last day in prison. His friends visited him and offered him an opportunity to escape, which he declined.[69]
The question of what motivated Athenians to convict Socrates remains controversial among scholars.[70] There are two theories. The first is that Socrates was convicted on religious grounds; the second, that he was accused and convicted for political reasons.[70] Another, more recent, interpretation synthesizes the religious and political theories, arguing that religion and state were not separate in ancient Athens.[71]
The argument for religious persecution is supported by the fact that Plato's and Xenophon's accounts of the trial mostly focus on the charges of impiety. In those accounts, Socrates is portrayed as making no effort to dispute the fact that he did not believe in the Athenian gods. Against this argument stands the fact that many skeptics and atheist philosophers during this time were not prosecuted.[72] According to the argument for political persecution, Socrates was targeted because he was perceived as a threat to democracy. It was true that Socrates did not stand for democracy during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants and that most of his pupils were against the democrats.[73] The case for it being a political persecution is usually challenged by the existence of an amnesty that was granted to Athenian citizens in 403 BC to prevent escalation to civil war after the fall of the Thirty. However, as the text from Socrates's trial and other texts reveal, the accusers could have fuelled their rhetoric using events prior to 403 BC.[74]
Philosophy
Socratic method
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A fundamental characteristic of Plato's Socrates is the Socratic method, or the method of refutation (elenchus).[76] It is most prominent in the early works of Plato, such as Apology, Crito, Gorgias, Republic I, and others.[77] The typical elenchus proceeds as follows. Socrates initiates a discussion about a topic with a supposed expert on the subject, usually in the company of some young men and boys, and by dialogue proves the expert's beliefs and arguments to be contradictory.[78] Socrates initiates the dialogue by asking his interlocutor for a definition of the subject. As he asks more questions, the interlocutor's answers eventually contradict the first definition. The conclusion is that the expert did not really know the definition in the first place.[79] The interlocutor may come up with a different definition. That new definition, in turn, comes under the scrutiny of Socratic questioning. With each round of question and answer, Socrates and his interlocutor hope to approach the truth. More often, they continue to reveal their ignorance.[80] Since the interlocutors' definitions most commonly represent the mainstream opinion on a matter, the discussion places doubt on the common opinion.[81]
Socrates also tests his own opinions through the Socratic method. Thus Socrates does not teach a fixed philosophical doctrine. Rather, he acknowledges his own ignorance while searching for truth with his pupils and interlocutors.[81]
Scholars have questioned the validity and the exact nature of the Socratic method, or indeed if there even was a Socratic method.[82] In 1982, the scholar of ancient philosophy Gregory Vlastos claimed that the Socratic method could not be used to establish the truth or falsehood of a proposition. Rather, Vlastos argued, it was a way to show that an interlocutor's beliefs were inconsistent.[83] There have been two main lines of thought regarding this view, depending on whether it is accepted that Socrates is seeking to prove a claim wrong.[84] According to the first line of thought, known as the constructivist approach, Socrates indeed seeks to refute a claim by this method, and the method helps in reaching affirmative statements.[85] The non-constructivist approach holds that Socrates merely wants to establish the inconsistency between the premises and the conclusion of the initial argument.[86]
Socratic priority of definition
Socrates starts his discussions by prioritizing the search for definitions.[87] In most cases, Socrates initiates his discourse with an expert on a subject by seeking a definition—by asking, for example, what virtue, goodness, justice, or courage is.[88] To establish a definition, Socrates first gathers clear examples of a virtue and then seeks to establish what they had in common.[89] According to Guthrie, Socrates lived in an era when sophists had challenged the meaning of various virtues, questioning their substance; Socrates's quest for a definition was an attempt to clear the atmosphere from their radical skepticism.[90]
Some scholars have argued that Socrates does not endorse the priority of definition as a principle, because they have identified cases where he does not do so.[91] Some have argued that this priority of definition comes from Plato rather than Socrates.[92] Philosopher Peter Geach, accepting that Socrates endorses the priority of definition, finds the technique fallacious. Αccording to Geach, one may know a proposition even if one cannot define the terms in which the proposition is stated.[93]
Socratic ignorance
Plato's Socrates often claims that he is aware of his own lack of knowledge, especially when discussing ethical concepts such as arete (i.e., goodness, courage) since he does not know the nature of such concepts.[95] For example, during his trial, with his life at stake, Socrates says: "I thought Evenus a happy man, if he really possesses this art (technē), and teaches for so moderate a fee. Certainly I would pride and preen myself if I knew (epistamai) these things, but I do not know (epistamai) them, gentlemen".[96] In some of Plato's dialogues, Socrates appears to credit himself with some knowledge, and can even seem strongly opinionated for a man who professes his own ignorance.[97]
There are varying explanations of the Socratic inconsistency (other than that Socrates is simply being inconsistent).[98] One explanation is that Socrates is being either ironic or modest for pedagogical purposes: he aims to let his interlocutor to think for himself rather than guide him to a prefixed answer to his philosophical questions.[99] Another explanation is that Socrates holds different interpretations of the meaning of "knowledge". Knowledge, for him, might mean systematic understanding of an ethical subject, on which Socrates firmly rejects any kind of mastery; or might refer to lower-level cognition, which Socrates may accept that he possesses.[100] In any case, there is a consensus that Socrates accepts that acknowledging one's lack of knowledge is the first step towards wisdom.[101]
Socrates is known for disavowing knowledge, a claim encapsulated in the saying "I know that I know nothing". This is often attributed to Socrates on the basis of a statement in Plato's Apology, though the same view is repeatedly found elsewhere in Plato's early writings on Socrates.[102] In other statements, though, he implies or even claims that he does have knowledge. For example, in Plato's Apology Socrates says: "...but that to do injustice and disobey my superior, god or man, this I know to be evil and base..." (Apology, 29b6–7).[103] In his debate with Callicles, he says: "...I know well that if you will agree with me on those things which my soul believes, those things will be the very truth..."[103]
Whether Socrates genuinely thought he lacked knowledge or merely feigned a belief in his own ignorance remains a matter of debate. A common interpretation is that he was indeed feigning modesty. According to Norman Gulley, Socrates did this to entice his interlocutors to speak with him. On the other hand, Terence Irwin claims that Socrates's words should be taken literally.[104]
Gregory Vlastos argues that there is enough evidence to refute both claims. In his view, for Socrates, there are two separate meanings of "knowledge": Knowledge-C and Knowledge-E (C stands for "certain", and E stands for elenchus, i.e. the Socratic method). Knowledge-C is something unquestionable whereas Knowledge-E is the knowledge derived from Socrates's elenchus.[105] Thus, Socrates speaks the truth when he says he knows-C something, and he is also truthful when saying he knows-E, for example, that it is evil for someone to disobey his superiors, as he claims in Apology.[106] Not all scholars have agreed with this semantic dualism. James H. Lesher has argued that Socrates claimed in various dialogues that one word is linked to one meaning (i.e. in Hippias Major, Meno, and Laches).[107] Lesher suggests that although Socrates claimed that he had no knowledge about the nature of virtues, he thought that in some cases, people can know some ethical propositions.[108]
Socratic irony
There is a widespread assumption that Socrates was an ironist, mostly based on the depiction of Socrates by Plato and Aristotle.[109] Socrates's irony is so subtle and slightly humorous that it often leaves the reader wondering if Socrates is making an intentional pun.[110] Plato's Euthyphro is filled with Socratic irony. The story begins when Socrates is meeting with Euthyphro, a man who has accused his own father of murder. When Socrates first hears the details of the story, he comments, "It is not, I think, any random person who could do this [prosecute one's father] correctly, but surely one who is already far progressed in wisdom". When Euthyphro boasts about his understanding of divinity, Socrates responds that it is "most important that I become your student".[111] Socrates is commonly seen as ironic when using praise to flatter or when addressing his interlocutors.[112]
Scholars are divided on why Socrates uses irony. According to an opinion advanced since the Hellenistic period, Socratic irony is a playful way to get the audience's attention.[113] Another line of thought holds that Socrates conceals his philosophical message with irony, making it accessible only to those who can separate the parts of his statements which are ironic from those which are not.[114] Gregory Vlastos has identified a more complex pattern of irony in Socrates. In Vlastos's view, Socrates's words have a double meaning, both ironic and not. One example is when he denies having knowledge. Vlastos suggests that Socrates is being ironic when he says he has no knowledge (where "knowledge" means a lower form of cognition); while, according to another sense of "knowledge", Socrates is serious when he says he has no knowledge of ethical matters. This opinion is not shared by many other scholars.[115]
Socratic eudaimonism and intellectualism
For Socrates, the pursuit of eudaimonia motivates all human action, directly or indirectly.[116] Virtue and knowledge are linked, in Socrates's view, to eudaimonia, but how closely he considered them to be connected is still debated. Some argue that Socrates thought that virtue and eudaimonia are identical. According to another view, virtue serves as a means to eudaimonia (the "identical" and "sufficiency" theses, respectively).[117] Another point of debate is whether, according to Socrates, people desire what is in fact good—or, rather, simply what they perceive as good.[117]
Moral intellectualism refers to the prominent role Socrates gave to knowledge. He believed that all virtue was based on knowledge (hence Socrates is characterized as a virtue intellectualist). He also believed that humans were guided by the cognitive power to comprehend what they desire, while diminishing the role of impulses (a view termed motivational intellectualism).[118] In Plato's Protagoras (345c4–e6), Socrates implies that "no one errs willingly", which has become the hallmark of Socratic virtue intellectualism.[119] In Socratic moral philosophy, priority is given to the intellect as being the way to live a good life; Socrates deemphasizes irrational beliefs or passions.[120] Plato's dialogues that support Socrates's intellectual motivism—as this thesis is named—are mainly the Gorgias (467c–8e, where Socrates discusses the actions of a tyrant that do not benefit him) and Meno (77d–8b, where Socrates explains to Meno his view that no one wants bad things, unless they do not know what is good and bad in the first place).[121] Scholars have been puzzled by Socrates's view that akrasia (acting because of one's irrational passions, contrary to one's knowledge or beliefs) is impossible. Most believe that Socrates left no space for irrational desires, although some claim that Socrates acknowledged the existence of irrational motivations, but denied they play a primary role in decision-making.[122]
Religion
Socrates's religious nonconformity challenged the views of his times and his critique reshaped religious discourse for the coming centuries.[125] In Ancient Greece, organized religion was fragmented, celebrated in a number of festivals for specific gods, such as the City Dionysia, or in domestic rituals, and there were no sacred texts. Religion intermingled with the daily life of citizens, who performed their personal religious duties mainly with sacrifices to various gods.[126] Whether Socrates was a practicing man of religion or a 'provocateur atheist' has been a point of debate since ancient times; his trial included impiety accusations, and the controversy has not yet ceased.[127]
Socrates discusses divinity and the soul mostly in Alcibiades, Euthyphro, and Apology.[128] In Alcibiades Socrates links the human soul to divinity, concluding "Then this part of her resembles God, and whoever looks at this, and comes to know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge of himself."[129] His discussions on religion always fall under the lens of his rationalism.[130] Socrates, in Euthyphro, reaches a conclusion which takes him far from the age's usual practice: he considers sacrifices to the gods to be useless, especially when they are driven by the hope of receiving a reward in return. Instead, he calls for philosophy and the pursuit of knowledge to be the principal way of worshipping the gods.[131] His rejection of traditional forms of piety, connecting them to self-interest, implied that Athenians should seek religious experience by self-examination.[132]
Socrates argued that the gods were inherently wise and just, a perception far from traditional religion at that time.[133] In Euthyphro, the Euthyphro dilemma arises. Socrates questions his interlocutor about the relationship between piety and the will of a powerful god: Is something good because it is the will of this god, or is it the will of this god because it is good?[134] In other words, does piety follow the good, or the god? The trajectory of Socratic thought contrasts with traditional Greek theology, which took lex talionis (the eye for an eye principle) for granted. Socrates thought that goodness is independent from gods, and gods must themselves be pious.[135]
Socrates affirms a belief in gods in Plato's Apology, where he says to the jurors that he acknowledges gods more than his accusers.[136] For Plato's Socrates, the existence of gods is taken for granted; in none of his dialogues does he probe whether gods exist or not.[137] In Apology, a case for Socrates being agnostic can be made, based on his discussion of the great unknown after death,[138] and in Phaedo (the dialogue with his students in his last day) Socrates gives expression to a clear belief in the immortality of the soul.[139] He also believed in oracles, divinations and other messages from gods. These signs did not offer him any positive belief on moral issues; rather, they were predictions of unfavorable future events.[140]
In Xenophon's Memorabilia, Socrates constructs an argument close to the contemporary teleological intelligent-design argument. He claims that since there are many features in the universe that exhibit "signs of forethought" (e.g., eyelids), a divine creator must have created the universe.[137] He then deduces that the creator should be omniscient and omnipotent and also that it created the universe for the advance of humankind, since humans naturally have many abilities that other animals do not.[141] At times, Socrates speaks of a single deity, while at other times he refers to plural "gods". This has been interpreted to mean that he either believed that a supreme deity commanded other gods, or that various gods were parts, or manifestations, of this single deity.[142]
The relationship of Socrates's religious beliefs with his strict adherence to rationalism has been subject to debate.[143] Philosophy professor Mark McPherran suggests that Socrates interpreted every divine sign through secular rationality for confirmation.[144] Professor of ancient philosophy A. A. Long suggests that it is anachronistic to suppose that Socrates believed the religious and rational realms were separate.[145]
Socratic daimonion
In several texts (e.g., Plato's Euthyphro 3b5; Apology 31c–d; Xenophon's Memorabilia 1.1.2) Socrates claims he hears a daimōnic sign—an inner voice heard usually when he was about to make a mistake. Socrates gave a brief description of this daimonion at his trial (Apology 31c–d): "...The reason for this is something you have heard me frequently mention in different places—namely, the fact that I experience something divine and daimonic, as Meletus has inscribed in his indictment, by way of mockery. It started in my childhood, the occurrence of a particular voice. Whenever it occurs, it always deters me from the course of action I was intending to engage in, but it never gives me positive advice. It is this that has opposed my practicing politics, and I think its doing so has been absolutely fine."[147] Modern scholarship has variously interpreted this Socratic daimōnion as a rational source of knowledge, an impulse, a dream or even a paranormal experience felt by an ascetic Socrates.[148]
Virtue and knowledge
Socrates's theory of virtue states that all virtues are essentially one, since they are a form of knowledge.[149] For Socrates, the reason a person is not good is because they lack knowledge. Since knowledge is united, virtues are united as well. Another famous dictum—"no one errs willingly"—also derives from this theory.[150] In Protagoras, Socrates argues for the unity of virtues using the example of courage: if someone knows what the relevant danger is, they can undertake a risk.[149] Aristotle comments: " ... Socrates the elder thought that the end of life was knowledge of virtue, and he used to seek for the definition of justice, courage, and each of the parts of virtue, and this was a reasonable approach, since he thought that all virtues were sciences, and that as soon as one knew [for example] justice, he would be just..."[151]
Love
Some texts suggest that Socrates had love affairs with Alcibiades and other young persons; others suggest that Socrates's friendships with young boys sought only to improve them and were not sexual. In Gorgias, Socrates claims he was a dual lover of Alcibiades and philosophy, and his flirtatiousness is evident in Protagoras, Meno (76a–c) and Phaedrus (227c–d). However, the exact nature of his relationship with Alcibiades is not clear; Socrates was known for his self-restraint, while Alcibiades admits in the Symposium that he had tried to seduce Socrates but failed.[152]
The Socratic theory of love is mostly deduced from Lysis, where Socrates discusses love[153] at a wrestling school in the company of Lysis and his friends. They start their dialogue by investigating parental love and how it manifests with respect to the freedom and boundaries that parents set for their children. Socrates concludes that if Lysis is utterly useless, nobody will love him—not even his parents. While most scholars believe this text was intended to be humorous, it has also been suggested that Lysis shows Socrates held an egoistic view of love, according to which we only love people who are useful to us in some way.[154] Other scholars disagree with this view, arguing that Socrates's doctrine leaves room for non-egoistic love for a spouse; still others deny that Socrates suggests any egoistic motivation at all.[155] In Symposium, Socrates argues that children offer the false impression of immortality to their parents, and this misconception yields a form of unity among them.[156] Scholars also note that for Socrates, love is rational.[157]
Socrates, who claims to know only that he does not know, makes an exception (in Plato's Symposium), where he says he will tell the truth about Love, which he learned from a 'clever woman'. Classicist Armand D'Angour has made the case that Socrates was in his youth close to Aspasia, and that Diotima, to whom Socrates attributes his understanding of love in Symposium, is based on her;[158] however, it is also possible that Diotima really existed.
Socratic philosophy of politics
While Socrates was involved in public political and cultural debates, it is hard to define his exact political philosophy. In Plato's Gorgias, he tells Callicles: "I believe that I'm one of a few Athenians—so as not to say I'm the only one, but the only one among our contemporaries—to take up the true political craft and practice the true politics. This is because the speeches I make on each occasion do not aim at gratification but at what's best."[159] His claim illustrates his aversion for the established democratic assemblies and procedures such as voting—since Socrates saw politicians and rhetoricians as using tricks to mislead the public.[160] He never ran for office or suggested any legislation.[161] Rather, he aimed to help the city flourish by "improving" its citizens.[160] As a citizen, he abided by the law. He obeyed the rules and carried out his military duty by fighting wars abroad. His dialogues, however, make little mention of contemporary political decisions, such as the Sicilian Expedition.[161]
Socrates spent his time conversing with citizens, among them powerful members of Athenian society, scrutinizing their beliefs and bringing the contradictions of their ideas to light. Socrates believed he was doing them a favor since, for him, politics was about shaping the moral landscape of the city through philosophy rather than electoral procedures.[162] There is a debate over where Socrates stood in the polarized Athenian political climate, which was divided between oligarchs and democrats. While there is no clear textual evidence, one widely held theory holds that Socrates leaned towards democracy: he disobeyed the one order that the oligarchic government of the Thirty Tyrants gave him; he respected the laws and political system of Athens (which were formulated by democrats); and, according to this argument, his affinity for the ideals of democratic Athens was a reason why he did not want to escape prison and the death penalty. On the other hand, there is some evidence that Socrates leaned towards oligarchy: most of his friends supported oligarchy, he was contemptuous of the opinion of the many and was critical of the democratic process, and Protagoras shows some anti-democratic elements.[163] A less mainstream argument suggests that Socrates favoured democratic republicanism, a theory that prioritizes active participation in public life and concern for the city.[164]
Yet another suggestion is that Socrates endorsed views in line with liberalism, a political ideology formed in the Age of Enlightenment. This argument is mostly based on Crito and Apology, where Socrates talks about the mutually beneficial relationship between the city and its citizens. According to Socrates, citizens are morally autonomous and free to leave the city if they wish—but, by staying within the city, they also accept the laws and the city's authority over them.[165] On the other hand, Socrates has been seen as the first proponent of civil disobedience. Socrates's strong objection to injustice, along with his refusal to serve the Thirty Tyrants' order to arrest Leon, are suggestive of this line. As he says in Critias, "One ought never act unjustly, even to repay a wrong that has been done to oneself."[166] Ιn the broader picture, Socrates's advice would be for citizens to follow the orders of the state, unless, after much reflection, they deem them to be unjust.[167]
Legacy
Classical antiquity
Socrates's impact was immense in philosophy after his death. With the exception of the Epicureans and the Pyrrhonists, almost all philosophical currents after Socrates traced their roots to him: Plato's Academy, Aristotle's Lyceum, the Cynics, and the Stoics.[168] Interest in Socrates kept increasing until the third century AD.[169] The various schools differed in response to fundamental questions such as the purpose of life or the nature of arete (virtue), since Socrates had not handed them an answer, and therefore, philosophical schools subsequently diverged greatly in their interpretation of his thought.[170] He was considered to have shifted the focus of philosophy from a study of the natural world, as was the case for pre-Socratic philosophers, to a study of human affairs.[171]
Immediate followers of Socrates were his pupils, Euclid of Megara, Aristippus, and Antisthenes, who drew differing conclusions among themselves and followed independent trajectories.[172] The full doctrines of Socrates's pupils are difficult to reconstruct.[173] Antisthenes had a profound contempt of material goods. According to him, virtue was all that mattered. Diogenes and the Cynics continued this line of thought.[174] On the opposite end, Aristippus endorsed the accumulation of wealth and lived a luxurious life. After leaving Athens and returning to his home city of Cyrene, he founded the Cyrenaic philosophical school which was based on hedonism, and endorsing living an easy life with physical pleasures. His school passed to his grandson, bearing the same name. There is a dialogue in Xenophon's work in which Aristippus claims he wants to live without wishing to rule or be ruled by others.[175] In addition, Aristippus maintained a skeptical stance on epistemology, claiming that we can be certain only of our own feelings. This view resonates with the Socratic understanding of ignorance.[176] Euclid was a contemporary of Socrates. After Socrates's trial and death, he left Athens for the nearby town of Megara, where he founded a school, named the Megarians. His theory was built on the pre-Socratic monism of Parmenides. Euclid continued Socrates's thought, focusing on the nature of virtue.
The Stoics relied heavily on Socrates.[177] They applied the Socratic method as a tool to avoid inconsistencies. Their moral doctrines focused on how to live a smooth life through wisdom and virtue. The Stoics assigned virtue a crucial role in attaining happiness and also prioritized the relation between goodness and ethical excellence, all of which echoed Socratic thought.[178] At the same time, the philosophical current of Platonism claimed Socrates as its predecessor, in ethics and in its theory of knowledge. Arcesilaus, who became the head of the Academy about 80 years after its founding by Plato, radically changed the Academy's doctrine to what is now known as Academic Skepticism, centered on the Socratic philosophy of ignorance. The Academic Skeptics competed with the Stoics over who was Socrates's true heir with regard to ethics.[179] While the Stoics insisted on knowledge-based ethics, Arcesilaus relied on Socratic ignorance. The Stoics' reply to Arcesilaus was that Socratic ignorance was part of Socratic irony (they themselves disapproved the use of irony), an argument that ultimately became the dominant narrative of Socrates in later antiquity.[180]
While Aristotle considered Socrates an important philosopher, Socrates was not a central figure in Aristotelian thought. One of Aristotle's pupils, Aristoxenus even authored a book detailing Socrates's scandals.
The Epicureans were antagonistic to Socrates.[181] They attacked him for superstition, criticizing his belief in his daimonion and his regard for the oracle at Delphi.[182] They also criticized Socrates for his character and various faults, and focusing mostly on his irony, which was deemed inappropriate for a philosopher and unseemly for a teacher.[183]
The Pyrrhonists were also antagonistic to Socrates, accusing him of being a prater about ethics, who engaged in mock humility, and who sneered at and mocked people.[184]
Medieval world
Socratic thought found its way to the Islamic Middle East alongside that of Aristotle and the Stoics. Plato's works on Socrates, as well as other ancient Greek literature, were translated into Arabic by early Muslim scholars such as Al-Kindi, Jabir ibn Hayyan, and the Muʿtazila. For Muslim scholars, Socrates was hailed and admired for combining his ethics with his lifestyle, perhaps because of the resemblance in this regard with Muhammad's personality.[185] Socratic doctrines were altered to match Islamic faith: according to Muslim scholars, Socrates made arguments for monotheism and for the temporality of this world and rewards in the next life.[186] His influence in the Arabic-speaking world continues to the present day.[187]
In medieval times, little of Socrates's thought survived in the Christian world as a whole; however, works on Socrates from Christian scholars such as Lactantius, Eusebius and Augustine were maintained in the Byzantine Empire, where Socrates was studied under a Christian lens.[188] After the fall of Constantinople, many of the texts were brought back into the world of Roman Christianity, where they were translated into Latin. Overall, ancient Socratic philosophy, like the rest of classical literature before the Renaissance, was addressed with skepticism in the Christian world at first.[189]
During the early Italian Renaissance, two different narratives of Socrates developed.[190] On the one hand, the humanist movement revived interest in classical authors. Leonardo Bruni translated many of Plato's Socratic dialogues, while his pupil Giannozzo Manetti authored a well-circulated book, a Life of Socrates. They both presented a civic version of Socrates, according to which Socrates was a humanist and a supporter of republicanism. Bruni and Manetti were interested in defending secularism as a non-sinful way of life; presenting a view of Socrates that was aligned with Christian morality assisted their cause. In doing so, they had to censor parts of his dialogues, especially those which appeared to promote homosexuality or any possibility of pederasty (with Alcibiades), or which suggested that the Socratic daimon was a god.[191] On the other hand, a different picture of Socrates was presented by Italian Neoplatonists, led by the philosopher and priest Marsilio Ficino. Ficino was impressed by Socrates's un-hierarchical and informal way teaching, which he tried to replicate. Ficino portrayed a holy picture of Socrates, finding parallels with the life of Jesus Christ. For Ficino and his followers, Socratic ignorance signified his acknowledgement that all wisdom is God-given (through the Socratic daimon).[192]
Modern times
In early modern France, Socrates's image was dominated by features of his private life rather than his philosophical thought, in various novels and satirical plays.[194] Some thinkers used Socrates to highlight and comment upon controversies of their own era, like Théophile de Viau who portrayed a Christianized Socrates accused of atheism,[195] while for Voltaire, the figure of Socrates represented a reason-based theist.[196] Michel de Montaigne wrote extensively on Socrates, linking him to rationalism as a counterweight to contemporary religious fanatics.[197]
In the 18th century, German idealism revived philosophical interest in Socrates, mainly through Hegel's work. For Hegel, Socrates marked a turning point in the history of humankind by the introduction of the principle of free subjectivity or self-determination. While Hegel hails Socrates for his contribution, he nonetheless justifies the Athenian court, for Socrates's insistence upon self-determination would be destructive of the Sittlichkeit (a Hegelian term signifying the way of life as shaped by the institutions and laws of the State).[198] Also, Hegel sees the Socratic use of rationalism as a continuation of Protagoras' focus on human reasoning (as encapsulated in the motto homo mensura: "man is the measure of all things"), but modified: it is our reasoning that can help us reach objective conclusions about reality.[199] Also, Hegel considered Socrates as a predecessor of later ancient skeptic philosophers, even though he never clearly explained why.[200]
Søren Kierkegaard considered Socrates his teacher,[201] and authored his master's thesis on him, The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates.[202] There he argues that Socrates is not a moral philosopher but is purely an ironist.[203] He also focused on Socrates's avoidance of writing: for Kierkegaard, this avoidance was a sign of humility, deriving from Socrates's acceptance of his ignorance.[204] Not only did Socrates not write anything down, according to Kierkegaard, but his contemporaries misconstrued and misunderstood him as a philosopher, leaving us with an almost impossible task in comprehending Socratic thought.[202] Only Plato's Apology was close to the real Socrates, in Kierkegaard's view.[205] In his writings, he revisited Socrates quite frequently; in his later work, Kierkegaard found ethical elements in Socratic thought.[203] Socrates was not only a subject of study for Kierkegaard, he was a model as well: Kierkegaard paralleled his task as a philosopher to Socrates. He writes, "The only analogy I have before me is Socrates; my task is a Socratic task, to audit the definition of what it is to be a Christian", with his aim being to bring society closer to the Christian ideal, since he believed that Christianity had become a formality, void of any Christian essence.[206] Kierkegaard denied being a Christian, as Socrates denied possessing any knowledge.[207]
Friedrich Nietzsche resented Socrates's contributions to Western culture.[208] In his first book, The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche held Socrates responsible for what he saw as the deterioration of ancient Greek civilization during the 4th century BC and after. For Nietzsche, Socrates turned the scope of philosophy from pre-Socratic naturalism to rationalism and intellectualism. He writes: "I conceive of [the Presocratics] as precursors to a reformation of the Greeks: but not of Socrates"; "with Empedocles and Democritus the Greeks were well on their way towards taking the correct measure of human existence, its unreason, its suffering; they never reached this goal, thanks to Socrates".[209] The effect, Nietzsche proposed, was a perverse situation that had continued down to his day: our culture is a Socratic culture, he believed.[208] In a later publication, The Twilight of the Idols (1887), Nietzsche continued his offensive against Socrates, focusing on the arbitrary linking of reason to virtue and happiness in Socratic thinking. He writes: "I try to understand from what partial and idiosyncratic states the Socratic problem is to be derived: his equation of reason = virtue = happiness. It was with this absurdity of a doctrine of identity that he fascinated: ancient philosophy never again freed itself [from this fascination]".[210] From the late 19th century until the early 20th, the most common explanation of Nietzsche's hostility towards Socrates was his anti-rationalism; he considered Socrates the father of European rationalism. In the mid-20th century, philosopher Walter Kaufmann published an article arguing that Nietzsche admired Socrates. Current mainstream opinion is that Nietzsche was ambivalent towards Socrates.[211]
Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss and Karl Popper, after experiencing the horrors of World War II, amidst the rise of totalitarian regimes, saw Socrates as an icon of individual conscience.[212] Arendt, in Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), suggests that Socrates's constant questioning and self-reflection could prevent the banality of evil.[213] Strauss considers Socrates's political thought as paralleling Plato's. He sees an elitist Socrates in Plato's Republic as exemplifying why the polis is not, and could not be, an ideal way of organizing life, since philosophical truths cannot be digested by the masses.[214] Popper takes the opposite view: he argues that Socrates opposes Plato's totalitarian ideas. For Popper, Socratic individualism, along with Athenian democracy, imply Popper's concept of the "open society" as described in his The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945).[215]
See also
Notes
- Amy C. Smith (2003), “Athenian Political Art from the fifth and fourth centuries BCE: Images of Historical Individuals,” p. 14, in C.W. Blackwell, ed., Dēmos: Classical Athenian Democracy. The Stoa: a consortium for electronic publication in the humanities.
- Jones 2006.
- "Socrates (469—399 B.C.E.)". Internet encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved 27 August 2024.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 5–7; Dorion 2011, pp. 1–2; May 2000, p. 9; Waterfield 2013, p. 1.
- May 2000, p. 20; Dorion 2011, p. 7; Waterfield 2013, p. 1.
- Doering 2011, pp. 24–25.
- Dorion 2011, pp. 7–9.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 335.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 339.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 345.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 29–31; Dorion 2011, p. 6.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 30.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 29–33; Waterfield 2013, pp. 3–4.
- May 2000, p. 20; Dorion 2011, pp. 6–7.
- May 2000, p. 20; Waterfield 2013, pp. 3–4.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 15.
- May 2000, pp. 19–20.
- Dorion 2011, pp. 4, 10.
- Waterfield 2013, pp. 10–13.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 39–41.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 39–51.
- Ahbel-Rappe 2011, p. 5.
- Konstan 2011, pp. 85, 88.
- Waterfield 2013, pp. 7–8.
- Vlastos 1991, p. 52; Kahn 1998, pp. 1–2.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 35–36; Waterfield 2013, p. 8.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 38.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 38–39.
- Dorion 2011, pp. 11, 16; Waterfield 2013, p. 11.
- Waterfield 2013, pp. 8–11.
- Waterfield 2013, p. 11.
- Dorion 2011, pp. 1–3.
- Dorion 2011, pp. 2–3.
- Dorion 2011, p. 5.
- Dorion 2011, pp. 7–10.
- Dorion 2011, pp. 12–14.
- Dorion 2011, pp. 17–18.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 2.
- Ober 2010, pp. 159–160; Ahbel-Rappe 2011, p. 1; Guthrie 1972, p. 58; Dorion 2011, p. 12; Nails 2020, A chronology of the historical Socrates in the context of Athenian history and the dramatic dates of Plato's dialogues.
- Ober 2010, pp. 160–161.
- Ober 2010, pp. 161–162.
- Ober 2010, p. 161.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 65.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 59.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 65; Ober 2010, pp. 167–171.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 78.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 66–67.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 69.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 70–75; Nails 2020, Socrates's strangeness.
- Obdrzalek 2013, pp. 210–211; Nails 2020, Socrates's strangeness.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 92–94; Nails 2020, Socrates's strangeness.
- Kahn 1998, p. 75.
- Ahbel-Rappe 2011, pp. 15–19.
- Ahbel-Rappe 2011, pp. 17, 21.
- Plato. "Phaedo". Perseus. Retrieved 1 March 2024.
See §118a
- May 2000, p. 30, 40.
- May 2000, pp. 47–48.
- Danzig, Gabriel. 2003. "Apologizing for Socrates: Plato and Xenophon on Socrates' Behavior in Court." Transactions of the American Philological Association. Vol. 133, No. 2, pp. 285.
- Nails 2020, A Chronology of the historical Socrates.
- May 2000, p. 31.
- May 2000, pp. 33–39.
- May 2000, pp. 41–42.
- May 2000, p. 42.
- May 2000, p. 43.
- May 2000, pp. 45–46.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 65–66.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 63–65; Ahbel-Rappe 2011; Ober 2010, p. 146.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 64–65.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 20, 65–66; Ober 2010, p. 146.
- Ralkowski 2013, p. 302.
- Ralkowski 2013, p. 323.
- Ralkowski 2013, pp. 319–322.
- Ralkowski 2013, pp. 307–308.
- Ralkowski 2013, pp. 303–304.
- Ahbel-Rappe 2011, p. 53.
- Benson 2011, p. 179; Wolfsdorf 2013, pp. 34–35.
- Wolfsdorf 2013, p. 34: Others include Charmides, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Protagoras. Benson 2011, p. 179, also adds parts of Meno.
- Benson 2011, pp. 182–184; Wolfsdorf 2013, pp. 34–35.
- Benson 2011, p. 184.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 125–127.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 128–129.
- Benson 2011, pp. 179, 185–193.
- Benson 2011, p. 185; Wolfsdorf 2013, pp. 34–35; Ambury 2020, The Elenchus: Socrates the Refuter.
- Benson 2011, p. 185; Wolfsdorf 2013, p. 44; Ambury 2020, The Elenchus: Socrates the Refuter.
- Benson 2011, p. 185.
- Ambury 2020, The Elenchus: Socrates the Refuter: Benson (2011) names in a note scholars that are of constructivist and non-constructivism approach: "Among those "constructivists" willing to do so are Brickhouse and Smith 1994, ch. 6.1; Burnet 1924, pp. 136–137; McPherran 1985; Rabinowitz 1958; Reeve 1989, ch. 1.10; Taylor 1982; and Vlastos 1991, ch. 6. Those who do not think a Socratic account of piety is implied by the text ("anticonstructivists") include Allen 1970, pp. 6–9, 67; and Grote 1865, pp. 437–457. Beckman 1979, ch. 2.1; Calef 1995; and Versényi 1982" p.118
- Benson 2013, p. 136.
- Benson 2013, pp. 136–139; Ahbel-Rappe 2011, p. 71.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 112.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 110–111.
- Benson 2013, pp. 143–145; Bett 2011, p. 228.
- Benson 2013, pp. 143–145, 147; Bett 2011, p. 229.
- Benson 2013, p. 145.
- Ahbel-Rappe 2011, p. 144.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 122; Bett 2011, p. 215; McPartland 2013, pp. 94–95.
- McPartland 2013, p. 98.
- McPartland 2013, pp. 108–109.
- McPartland 2013, p. 117.
- McPartland 2013, p. 119.
- McPartland 2013, pp. 117–119.
- McPartland 2013, pp. 118–119.
- Vlastos 1985, p. 1.
- Vlastos 1985, pp. 6–7.
- Vlastos 1985, pp. 1–2; Lesher 1987, p. 275.
- Lesher 1987, p. 276.
- Lesher 1987, p. 276; Vasiliou 2013, p. 28.
- Lesher 1987, p. 278; McPartland 2013, p. 123.
- McPartland 2013, pp. 123–124.
- Lane 2011, p. 239.
- Vasiliou 2013, p. 20.
- Vasiliou 2013, p. 24; Lane 2011, p. 239.
- Lane 2011, pp. 249–251.
- Lane 2011, pp. 241–242.
- Lane 2011, p. 243.
- Vasiliou 2013, pp. 28–29.
- Brickhouse & Smith 2013, p. 185; Vlastos 1991, p. 203.
- Reshotko 2013, p. 158.
- Brickhouse & Smith 2013, p. 185.
- Segvic 2006, pp. 171–173.
- Segvic 2006, p. 171.
- Brickhouse & Smith 2013, pp. 185–186.
- Brickhouse & Smith 2013, pp. 190–191.
- Ausland 2019, pp. 686–687.
- McPherran 2011, p. 117.
- McPherran 2013, p. 257.
- McPherran 2013, pp. 259–260.
- McPherran 2013, pp. 257–258.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 151–153.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 153.
- McPherran 2013, pp. 260–262; McPherran 2011, p. 111.
- McPherran 2013, p. 265.
- McPherran 2013, p. 266.
- McPherran 2013, pp. 263–266.
- McPherran 2013, p. 263:See also note 30 for further reference; McPherran 2011, p. 117.
- McPherran 2011, pp. 117–119.
- McPherran 2013, pp. 272–273.
- McPherran 2013, pp. 270–271.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 157–158.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 160–164.
- McPherran 2011, pp. 123–127.
- McPherran 2013, pp. 270–271; Long 2009, p. 63.
- McPherran 2013, p. 272; Long 2009, p. 63.
- McPherran 2011, pp. 114–115.
- McPherran 2011, p. 124.
- Long 2009, p. 64.
- Lapatin 2009, p. 146.
- Long 2009, pp. 63–64.
- Long 2009, pp. 65–66, 70.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 131.
- Rowe 2006, pp. 164–165.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 131; Ahbel-Rappe & Kamtekar 2009, p. 72.
- Obdrzalek 2013, pp. 210–211.
- Obdrzalek 2013, pp. 211–212; Rudebusch 2009, p. 187.
- Obdrzalek 2013, pp. 214–215.
- Obdrzalek 2013, p. 212.
- Obdrzalek 2013, p. 231.
- Obdrzalek 2013, p. 230.
- D'Angour 2019.
- Griswold 2011, pp. 333–341; Johnson 2013, p. 234.
- Johnson 2013, p. 234.
- Griswold 2011, p. 334.
- Johnson 2013, p. 235.
- Johnson 2013, pp. 236–237.
- Johnson 2013, p. 238.
- Johnson 2013, pp. 239–241.
- Johnson 2013, pp. 241–242.
- Johnson 2013, pp. 255–256.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 99, 165; Long 2011, p. 355; Ahbel-Rappe 2011, pp. 95–96.
- Long 2011, pp. 355–356.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 165–166; Long 2011, pp. 355–357.
- Long 2011, p. 358.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 169.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 179–183.
- Guthrie 1972, p. 170.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 170–174.
- Guthrie 1972, pp. 175–177.
- Long 2011, p. 362.
- Long 2011, pp. 362–264.
- Long 2011, pp. 364–365.
- Long 2011, p. 367.
- Long 2011, pp. 368–369.
- Long 2011, p. 374.
- Campos-Daroca 2019, p. 240; Lane 2011, p. 244; Long 2011, p. 370.
- "Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers Book II, Chapter 5, Section 19". Archived from the original on 24 January 2022. Retrieved 24 January 2022.
- Alon 2009, pp. 317–318.
- Alon 2009, pp. 325–326.
- Alon 2009, p. 332.
- Trizio 2019, pp. 609–610; Hankins 2009, p. 352.
- Hankins 2009, pp. 337–340.
- Hankins 2009, pp. 348–349.
- Hankins 2009, pp. 341–346.
- Hankins 2009, pp. 346–348.
- Lapatin 2009, pp. 133–139.
- McLean 2009, pp. 353–354.
- McLean 2009, p. 355.
- Loughlin 2019, p. 665.
- Ahbel-Rappe 2011, p. 12.
- Bowman 2019, pp. 751–753.
- Bowman 2019, pp. 753, 761–763.
- White 2009, pp. 373–374.
- Schur & Yamato 2019, p. 820.
- Schur & Yamato 2019, p. 824.
- Muench 2009, p. 389.
- Schur & Yamato 2019, pp. 824–825.
- Muench 2009, p. 390.
- Muench 2009, pp. 390–391:Quote from Kierkegaard's essay My Task (1855)
- Muench 2009, p. 394.
- Raymond 2019, p. 837.
- Porter 2009, pp. 408–409; Ambury 2020, Legacy: How Have Other Philosophers Understood Socrates?.
- Porter 2009, pp. 410–411.
- Raymond 2019, pp. 837–839.
- Ahbel-Rappe 2011, p. 127.
- Ahbel-Rappe 2011, pp. 137–138.
- Ahbel-Rappe 2011, pp. 138–140.
- Ahbel-Rappe 2011, pp. 140–142.
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- Jones, Daniel (2006). English Pronouncing Dictionary. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-68086-8.
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- Long, A.A. (2009). "How Does Socrates' Divine Sign Communicate with Him?". In Sara Ahbel-Rappe (ed.). A Companion to Socrates. Rachana Kamtekar. Wiley. pp. 63–74. doi:10.1002/9780470996218.ch5. ISBN 978-1-4051-5458-1.
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- Vlastos, Gregory (1991). Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-9787-2.
- Waterfield, Robin (2013). "Quest for the historical Socrates". In Nicholas D. Smith (ed.). The Bloomsbury Companion to Socrates. John Bussanich. A&C Black. pp. 1–19. ISBN 978-1-4411-1284-2. Archived from the original on 29 February 2024. Retrieved 1 June 2021.
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Further reading
- Brun, Jean (1978). Socrate (in French) (6th ed.). Presses universitaires de France. pp. 39–40. ISBN 978-2-13-035620-2.
- Benson, Hugh (1992). Essays on the philosophy of Socrates. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-506757-6. OCLC 23179683.
- Rudebusch, George (2009). Socrates. Chichester, UK; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-1-4051-5085-9. OCLC 476311710.
- Taylor, C. C. W. (1998). Socrates. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-287601-0.
- Taylor, C. C. W. (2019). Socrates: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-883598-1.
- Vlastos, Gregory (1994). Socratic Studies. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-44735-5.
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"The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing."
Socrates, the classical Greek philosopher, left a legacy of profound insights on knowledge, virtue, and the examined life. Some of his most famous quotes include:
On Wisdom and Knowledge:
- "The unexamined life is not worth living."
- "I know that I am intelligent, because I know that I know nothing."
- "Education is the kindling of a flame, not the filling of a vessel."
- "Wonder is the beginning of wisdom."
- "To find yourself, think for yourself."
On Virtue and Ethics: - "There is only one good, knowledge, and one evil, ignorance."
- "One must never do wrong."
- "It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong."
- "The good man cannot be harmed either in life or after death."
- "No one errs willingly."
On Life and Happiness: - "Be kind, for everyone you meet is fighting a hard battle."
- "He who is not contented with what he has, would not be contented with what he would like to have."
- "Not life, but good life, is to be chiefly valued."
- "Falling down is not a failure. Failure comes when you stay where you have fallen."
- "The secret of happiness is not found in seeking more, but in developing the capacity to enjoy less."
On Friendship and Relationships: - "Be slow to fall into friendship, but when you are in, continue firm and constant."
- "There is no possession more valuable than a good and faithful friend."
- "Sometimes you put walls up not to keep people out, but to see who cares enough to break them down."
On Self-Reflection and Personal Growth: - "I cannot teach anybody anything. I can only make them think."
- "Admit limits, seek truth, and keep correcting yourself in public and in private."
- "If I make a mistake and do not correct it, that is what I call a mistake."
- "Let us follow the argument wherever it leads."
These quotes reflect Socrates’ emphasis on self-awareness, ethical living, and the pursuit of knowledge, encouraging reflection, critical thinking, and moral integrity in everyday life
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